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ABSTRACT
This thesis provides a brief historical overview of federal policies designed to promote
the expansion or economic viability of certain industries. Federal railroad, irrigation, and
tariff policies are then explored in greater detail to determine their effect on both the target
industry and the economy as a whole. The outcome of this study can assist in determining
the desirability of an expanded role by the Federal Government, and specifically the
Department of Defense (DOD) through the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA),
into a more broad based industrial policy.
The past and present federal policies dealing with the railroads, irrigation, and tariffs
have all failed to make any of the target industries financially self sustaining. They have
instead created a number of bureaucratic bodies designed to service the needs of their
respective industries. The aggregate costs of these programs far exceed any imagined
benefit. To adopt similar policies within DOD in order to target specific industries for the
promotion of economic rather than national security concerns could only prove
detrimental to both.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the notion of a federally sponsored industrial policy has been taking root
within both economic and political circles. Specifically within the Department of Defense
(DOD), this "partnership" between industry and government has taken on a new name, if
not new form, in the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA). The notion of DOD
dollars being used to fund research in the private sector is nothing new. What seems to be
new, at least within DOD, is the trend away from defense specific agendas to a more
broad based approach of targeting selected industries with federal funds in an attempt to
assist that target group enhance its competitive stature and capture a greater market share
within the private sector.
The primary goal of this thesis is to discover whether or not the ideas embedded in an
industrial policy are indeed novel, or simply a redefinition of something that already exists.
This thesis will explore previous examples cf federal intervention into the economy and
attempt to evaluate the reasoning behind the policies, their effect, and what conclusions
may be drawn for the future.
The following questions will be addressed throughout the paperý Is the government
better able than the market place to spot sunrise industries? Does the government, and
will DOD specifically, make investment decisions based primarily on national security,
political, or economic rational" Is government able to allocate resources towards
industrial development in a way that is more efficient and effective than the private sector?
Does federal involvement serve to strengthen or weaken the target industries? And can
such a policy be implemented in a way that is fair and equitable to all players within our
"social contract?"
Chapters 11, Il1, and IV deal with three specific policies designed to influence industrial
economic development. Chapter II will address the Federal Government's role in the
railroad industry. Chapter III explores the Federal Government's role in irrigation
projects. And Chapter IV deals with the historic use of tariffs to shelter and promote
specific industries. These three areas of federal involvement provide a well rounded
overview of the various ways in which governmental action can shape economic events
The final chapter will provide a conclusion based upon the findings from the previous
chapters. The costs and benefits of federal intervention will be assessed, along with the
desirability of future federal involvement in other industries. For reference, Appendix A
presents a broad overview of most of the significant industrial policies which have been
implemented by government between 1789 and 1993.
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H. RAILROADS
In 1869, the first transcontinental rail line was completed by the Union Pacific and
Central Pacific railroads. This began the westward expansion of the railroads (Ref 7:p.
194). By 1890, there were 1013 railroad companies and just under 200,000 miles of
track, up from 35,000 miles in 1865 (Ref. 7:p. 194). The industry expanded rapidly
during this time period with nearly three times the number of independent railroads as
exist today. Why then did this industry fall prey to an onslaught of regulatory measures
beginning in 1887? This issue will be explored later.
The first section of this chapter will present a chronological description of all the
regulatory acts which impacted the industry. This will be followed by sections dealing
with federal land grants, loans, and subsidies to the railroad industry. The concluding
section will analyze the impact of these programs upon the industry and economy as a
whole.
A. REGULATORY HISTORY
The first regulation of the railroad industry was conducted by the courts in accordance
with the English tradition of common carriers. Railroads were expected to conform to the
following policies: the carrier may not refuse to serve; the carrier must serve at a
reasonable price; the carrier must serve all equally; and the carrier is responsible for the
safe delivery of the goods or persons committed to its care (Ref. 8:p. 20), This process
soon grew chaotic with judiciaries putting forth numerous and differing legal
3
interpretations. The courts soon requested formal regulations with greater specificity and
continuity. Many states took on this challenge.
FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY
REGULATORY ACT DATE
Supreme Court Ruling 1886




Army Appropriations Act 19161,
Transportation Act 1920;




National Rail Passenger Act 1971
Regional Rail Reorganization Act 1973
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act 1976
Staggers Act 1980
TABLE I (Ref 8)
States attempted to impose their own regulations beginning in the 1870's. Between
1873 and 1876, the Grange was very influential in legislating state railroad regulations in
Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin (Ref 2:p. 443). This proved to be the catalyst
that drove numerous states to impose their own railroad regulations. In 1886, the
Supreme Court ruled that states were not empowered to regulate interstate commerce
(Ref 8:p. 22). This put the regulatory ball directly in the federal courts.
In 1887, the Interstate Commerce Act was passed to consistently enforce a number of
legal principles already on the books. It required that rates be "just" and "reasonable",
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prohibiting discrimination against persons, shippers, or geographic areas. It also forbade
the practice of charging more for a short haul than a long one (Ref 8:p. 23). Finally, it
forbade colluding to control the amount of service provided and pooling equipment in that
service.
In an attempt to level out rail rates, some railroads joined together to establish
standardized rates. There was discontent among those passengers in high volume areas
who were likely to pay higher fares in the form of a cross subsidy. This led to the
Trans-Missouri Freight Association Case in 1897 and the Joint Traffic Freight Association
Case in 1898. The Supreme Court ruled that contracts between railroads used to regulate
pricing were a violation of the Sherman Act. The railroads responded to this decision by
merging and consolidating to limit regional competition. However, the consolidation
effort was turned back by the Northern Securities Case of 1904 (Ref 2:p. 336). Finally,
the railroads were forced to turn to the government for assistance in pricing policies. This
authority was latter given to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).
A number of related acts followed the Interstate Commerce Act, the first of which was
the Elkins Act of 1903. This act stated the punishment for discriminatory pricing (Ref
8:p. 23). The consequences of price discrimination were not defined by the Interstate
Commer:.,e Act.
The Hepburn Act of 1906 gave the ICC the right to set maximum rates (Ref 8:p. 23).
This made many rural routes unprofitable given the high fixed costs of rail transport.
5
Because of this, the number of railroads peaked at 1,564 in 1907 and has steadily declined
to this date (see Figure 1).
The Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 plugged loopholes in the law prohibiting higher rates for
short hauls than for longer ones (Ref 8:p 23) This proved very popular with the farming
community located in rural areas.
The ICC also sanctioned what came to be called "value-of-commodity" pricing (Ref.
8 :p. 24). High valued items were viewed as having lower demand elasticity than relatively
inexpensive commodities of the same weight Therefore, the more valuable a commodity
was per ton the higher the total shipping cost as a percentage of the total tonnage. This
provision benefited both the railroads and the farmers and created a pricing system which
was closely associated with monopoly pricing techniques. Although the policy was not
considered to conflict with the Interstate Commerce Act or its subsequent amendments, it
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Number of Operational Railroads From 1890 to 1970
Figure 1 (Ref I:p. 727-728)
With a threat of a national strike by the "operating brotherhoods" in 1916, the Adamson
Act was passed in an attempt to appease the unions. It implemented a standard eight hour
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work day. This failed to satisfy the unions and in 1917 it appeared as if a strike was once
again immanent, President Wilson believed that a railroad strike would create a national
emergency given the importance of war time mobilization. Thus, he employed the Army
Appropriations Act of 1916. This allowed for a Federal Government takeover of the
railroads. This occurred on December 26, 1917 (Ref 9:p. 145). To entice the unions,
substantial wage increases were granted, beginning on January 1, 1918. An eight-hour
work day was established for those railroad workers who did not already enjoy such
conditions, with time and a half wage rates for overtime work.
The first in a series of Transportation Acts was passed in 1920. The primary function
of this Act was to reverse the nationalization that occurred during W.W.I, and return the
railroad industry to private ownership. It allowed the ICC to set minimum rates. It also
allowed the ICC, not the states, to control the entry and abandonment of rail routes. The
ICC was able to limit competition in many areas by limiting entry. This produced higher
rates where required to subsidize the unprofitable lines It also promoted mergers among
railroads, creating a cross-subsidy for those weaker railroads which would have a difficult
time surviving on their own. In the event that the cross subsidies proved insufficient, then
direct subsidies were offered in the form of guaranteed loans to weaker railroads.
The attempt to promote mergers betwZ.n the profitable and unprofitable companies
proved unpopular with the profitable railroads. Because of this opposition, the ICC
abandoned its efforts to force mergers. Instead it passed the Motor Carrier Act of 1935
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which regulated the railroads' competition. The trucking industry had developed into a
real problem for the railroads, especially within the short haul market. The ICC decided to
regulate both rates and entry into the trucking industry in order to ensure price parity
between railroads and trucking.
The Transportation Act of 1940, extended the provisions of the Motor Carrier Act to
barge transportation. Both provisions provided certain exemptions: All motor carriers of
agricultural commodities were exempt from regulation, all single vessel water carriers of
bulk commodities, or tow of barges containing no more than three distinct commodities
were also exempt. In addition, when a carrier proposed a rate reduction, it was now up to
the carrier to justify the rate increase as "reasonable." Previously, someone who objected
to the reduction had to prove it "unreasonable." Finally, "a preamble was also added to
the Transportation Act of 1940 which stated that the ICC was to pursue policies adequate
to the needs of commerce, defense, and the postal system, and that would bring about
sound economic conditions among the carriers." (Ref 8 :p. 27)
The Reed-Bullwinkle Act of 1948, established rate bureaus for both rail and truck
transportation which served as a rate setting board.
The Transportation Act of 1958, amended the 1940 Act to state that "rates of a carrier
shall not be held up to a particular level to protect the trafc of any other mode of
transportation." This was later modified with a statement indicating that consideration
must also be given to the objective of "preserving sound economic conditions among all
the operators" (Ref 8 :p. 29). It also allowed for guaranteed loans to railroads in order to
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help those lines which were in financial trouble. It granted the ICC, not the states,
authority to discontinue passenger train services. Service was discontinued if it was no
longer needed for public convenience and necessity, or if its deficits were an undue burden
on interstate commerce.
The National Rail Passenger Act of 1971 created Amtrak to relieve the railroads of the
burden of maintaining unprofitable passenger services. Railroads had to pay a significant
initial amount to turn service over to Amtrak. They then had to grant Amtrak national
access to rail lines at a rate below their actual costs (Ref 8:p. 32).
Penn Central petitioned the ICC for permission to abandon 9,000 miles of unprofitable
track. The request was refused and Penn Central went into bankruptcy (requests were
usually disapproved if there was strong protest from shippers or local authorities). This
lead to the Regional Rail Reorganization Act (3R) of 1973. It established the Railway
Association to reorganize railroads in the Northeast from private to public ownership.
Conrail was formed out of the old Penn Central and several other bankrupt carriers in the
Northeast. Conrail contained 3,000 miles less track than its parent lines. (Ref 8:p. 33)
The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (4R) Act of 1976 was passed when
financial problems within the railroad industry began to spread beyond the Northeast.
The reform stated that no rate above variable costs should be considered ,.Lireasonable,
unless someone contesting it could prove otherwise. It stated that the ICC should
completely deregulate traffic where rail transportation had no monopoly power. The
commission was instructed to take the financial health of the railroad industry into
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consideration. In areas where a railroad did not dominate the market, the railroad was
free to increase or decrease rates seven percent without regulatory approval. The time
period was shortened within which the ICC must deal with a merger application and
directed the Secretary of Transportation to facilitate mergers and other coordination
projects. It also established that a railroad cannot be forced to provide service on which it
loses money. Return on investment was included in the estimate of "costs." It also limited
the time to complete deliberation to make it easier and less costly for railroads to pursue
abandonment. It stated that shippers who depend upon a service which files for
abandonment should consider paying higher rates for the service or form their own
shipping companies. Finally, it provided subsidies for lines which the ICC had approved
for abandonment, but which local authorities could demonstrate a need for continued
service. After the Act was passed, the ICC emasculated the provision giving railroads
seven percent rate flexibility where the railroads had no market dominance. The ICC
argued that if the railroads had the discretionary power to raise rates in this way, then they
had such dominance. The courts upheld the commission on this. (Ref 8:p. 35)
The Staggers Act of 1980 specified a ratio of revenues to variable costs that determined
if a carrier had market dominance. This ratio was 160 percent in 1980 and was raised
annually in five percent increments until 1985. The ratio allowed after 1984 depended on
the railroads ability to earn an "adequate" return on its investment The Act also
established a rate floor. The floor was set equal to variable costs. It allowed the
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commission to exempt certain rail transportation from regulation when there was strong
internodal competition. It phased out the right of railroads established in the
Reed-Bullwinkle Act of 1948 to collude through rate bureaus. It allowed only for
collective rate setting on joint interline rates. Contract rates were generally allowed if
their terms were publicly available and on file with the ICC. Contract rates could be
opposed if it could be proven that they represented unfair discrimination, but not by
competing carriers. It required that the railroad abandonment process be completed within
255 days, including responses to appeals. Opportunity costs were also considered in rail
line profitability, making the process of abandonment easier. It mandated that if an
unprofitable rail line was forced to operate, that the railroad should receive a subsidy to
ensure an adequate return on investment (not just variable and fixed costs). It set a time
limit of 300 days when deciding a merger request. It also included labor protection for
Conrail employees. (Ref 8-:p. 102)
The regulatory history of the railroads not only reveals the extent to which government
involved itself in the industry, but also some of the motivations behind the intervention.
Regulations which were initially designed to protect selected consumers soon gave way to
policies more concerned with the interests of both the industry, and to a greater extent, the
government bureaucracy designed to service it. The economic impact of these policies
will be dealt with in the concluding section. The next two sections will deal with federal
land grants, loans, and subsidies to the railroads.
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B. LAND GRANTS
The earliest direct Federal Government influence on industrial development occurred
with land grants. Land grants were first issued for the construction of wagon roads in
1823. This policy was extended for canal construction in 1827 and for river
improvements in 1828. Later, the government wanted to expedite the railroads expansion
westward. To achieve this, it relied on both land grants and financial assistance. Land
was given to railroads by all levels of government for depots, yards, and cross country rail
lines, although it was primarily a federal effort. In addition, loans were extended in the
form of bond purchases. (Ref 2:p. 328)
Land grants for the railroads were initiated in 1850. This policy was modified in 1864,
to increase the size of the land allotments. The new policy allowed each rail line to receive
a 400 foot right of way and the free use of timber and building materials from government
lands (Ref 2:p 328). The railroads were also granted ten alternate sections of land on
each side of the track, or 12,800 acres of land for each mile of railway completed.
Northern Pacific received an even more generous offer. They received 20 alternate
sections of land for each mile of track laid in the states, and 40 sections in the territories.
The new legislation also allowed for loans, ranging from $16,000 to $48,000 a mile,
depending upon the terrain of the construction area (Ref 2:p. 328). The Union Pacific
and Central Pacific iaifroads were paid after laying each twenty miles of railway. The
government was issued second m, ri.gage bonds from the railroads in exchange. The
railroads agreed to allocate five percent of their net returns towards debt retirement, and
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one-half of the revenue received from shipping government cargo or personnel (Ref 2-:p.
329).
The Federal Government gave about 175,350,000 acres of land to railroads between
1850 and 1871, when the land grant policy was fiaally terminated (Ref 2:p. 330). Of this,
about 35,000,000 acres were forfeited because railroads failed to uphold construction
requirements. The railroads also received 48,883,372 acres from nine states, bringing the
land grant total to about 190,000,000 acres (Ref 2:p. 330).
Prior to 1927, the railroads were able to sell their land for an average of $3.42 an acre
(Ref 2:p. 330). It has been estimated that by 1927 total land sales for the railroads
amounted to about $489 million after deducting administrative costs.
Some problems did begin to develop among railroads involved in the land grant
program. Many railroads were built in underdeveloped and largely non-populated
territories. The lack of traffic volume increased rates to overcome the high fixed
operating costs. Many of these lines eventually went bankrupt. The land grant policy also
generated a land grab atmosphere. This encouraged rushed and often faulty construction,
increasing long-term operation and maintenance costs. In some cases, ties were placed on
the ground and the rails spiked to them without constructing a road bed (Ref 2:p. 330).
Union Pacific and Central Pacific actually raced for land 'ror many miles, the two
railroads ran parallel to each other. Fights often broke out between the two competing
construction crews.
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In a number of cases, the contract for building a railroad was given to a construction
company owned or controlled by the promoters and their friends in both government and
financial circles. In these cases, the contract price was likely to be much higher than the
actual cost of construction. The owners of the company would simply pocket the
difference. This resulted in number of national scandals. In the case of Union Pacific, the
Credit Mobilizer, who was in charge of handling the construction contracts for Union
Pacific, issued a contract for the first 100 miles of construction at a cost of $60,000 a mile.
The engineers' estimate was $30,000 a mile (Ref 2:p. 331). Because of the inflated
estimates, the profits of the Credit Mobilizer ranged from 50 to 100 percent on its
investment. A similar situation developed with the Central Pacific Central Pacific paid
$120 million for a project whose actual cost amounted to only $58 million (Ref 2 :p. 331).
This type of behavior combined with the land grant policies themselves led to an over
expansion of the railroads. In subsequent years many railroads could not earn enough
money to pay dividends on their stock. It has been estimated that railroad debt amounted
to $7.5 billion in 1883 (Ref 2 :p. 331) They had the ability to carry far more freight than
was typically shipped. Even in 1890, one of the more prosperous years. only one-half of
all railroads were earning enough money to pay dividends on their stocks. In 1897, only
30 percent could pay dividends. The graft and bribery which was common within the
railroads throughout this period destroyed public confidence in both the railroads and
government. This led to a drive for greater railroad regulation.
14
The last land grant was extended in 1871. From that time forward the only direct
financial assistance was provided in the form of federally guaranteed loans and federal
subsidies. The following section will explore these policies as they have evolved to date.
C. LOANS AND SUBSIDIES
The Federal Government also used loans and subsidies to assist and influence railroad
development. The government occasionally offered low-interest guaranteed loans to
various "poor" railroads as far back as the Transportation Act of 1920 (Ref. 8:p. 121).
The Transportation Act of 1958 was used to prop up weak railroads through federally
guaranteed loans. These loans could be justified only in political terms. In the case of the
New Haven Railroad, its financial weakness was largely due to its inability to discontinue
its unprofitable passenger rail service. (Ref 8: p. 31)
Federal loans to the railroads between 1976 and 1988 took three basic forms (see
Appendix D): rail line rehabilitation; railroad programs, and United States Railway
Association. Loans to the United States Railway Association totaled over $3.1 billion
between 1976 and 1980. Loans to railroad programs began in 1979, and totaled $210
million by 1982. Loans directed towards rail line rehabilitation began in 1981 and totaled
$184 million by 1988.
Conrail rcceived federal subsidies of roughly four billion dollars between 1976 and 1981
(Ref 8:p. 33). The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act also subsidized
low-density and other unprofitable services outside the Northeast. The 4R Act channeled
money into these less successful private railroads at a rate of about $500 million a year.
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Capital and operational grants to Conrail totaled over three billion dollars from 1976 to
1981. The subsidies to Conrail have been used for an extravagant employee protection
plan. The plan guarantees a lifetime pension at his most recent wage. To any worker laid
off after the formation of Conrail (who has been employed for five years or more) the
worker also receives whatever general wage increases would have occurred over his
lifetime.
Similarly, a large part of 4R money for rail rehabilitation has been spent or, restoring
routes of faltering railroads. George W. Hilton, in his book entitled "The Transportation
Act of 1958," was probably right when he said low interest loans fulfill little function save
to postpone the day when a carrier goes bankrupt, with more loss than gain to society in
the process. (Ref 8:p. 122)
Subsidies within the 1976 act provided more than $500 million over a four year period
to subsidize money-losing branch lines, $600 million in grants for the rehabilitation of main
lines for financially weak railroads, one billion dollars in guaranteed loans for the same
purpose, $1.75 billion to upgrade Amtrak's Boston-Washington route, and $2.1 billion in
subsidies for Conrail (1976-80). (Ref. &:p. 35)
Railroad construction loans totaled about $65 million (Ref. 2 :p. 331). The record of
payments on these loans wa.- very good, with $125 million of the $130 million due in
principal and interest paid by 1900. Ultimately, $63 million of the $64 million of principal,
and $105 million in interest, was paid, for a total of $168 million on a $65 million loan
(Ref 2 :p. 331).
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The "betterment accounting" method is another hidden subsidy. It allows railroads to
write off investments in rails and ties for tax purposes in the year those investments are
made, rather than depreciating them over time. Since rails last up to fifty years and ties
twenty-five years, this rapid write-off reduces the railroads' corporate tax liabilities.
Between 1966, when the Department of Transportation was established, and 1991, total
budgetary expenditures by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) have amounted to
over $23.6 billion (see Appendix B). The FRA budget declined from a high of over $3.6
billion in 1981 to just under $538 million in 1988. This declining trend was reversed
however, and the budget climbed back up to $948 million in 1991.
D. CONCLUSION
The primary arguments in favor of greater federal involvement in the railroad industry
dealt with the need to both expand rail services, through land grants and later subsidies.
and to protect the consumers from transportation monopolies by means of regulatory
reform. At least in terms of early expansion, land grants seem to have been all too
successful.
The early debt of the industry (see Figure 2) was in no doubt largely brought about as a








Y1850-70 Y1870-90 Y1890-10 Y1910-30 Y1930-50
Growth in Debt Held by the Railroad Industry
Figure 2 (Appendix C)
relationship between railroad debt and the rate at which track was laid (see Figure 2 and
3). This further demonstrates the relationship between land grants and their effect on
excess supply. The primary problem with the land grants is that it made building railroads
profitable in the short term without addressing the needs for long term maintenance or
profitability.' Furthermore, much of the morey generated by the grants found its way into
construction companies partly owned by those with interest in the railroads. This often
generated profits for the construction companies' owners without the share holders taking
part in the windfall.
Similar problems with land grants were experienced in. the 1860's with the
construction of three east west wagon passages in Oregon. Although contractors made
returns of over 750 percent over a two year period, the construction was often shoddy and
unkeep nonexistent in areas with limited traffic. The net result was to exchange good
timber and farm land for three roads which, in hind site, were probably not all needed.
Even today, there is no east west highway across southern Oregon where one of the
wagon roads was constructed. But even if a need did exist, the benefit of the project was
probably not sufficient to warrant the cost. If it were, the road would have been built with
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Growth Rate in Mfiles of Track From 1865 to 1965
Figure 3 (Appendix D)
The second argument in support of federal involvement dealt with the threat of a
transportation monopoly within the railroad industry. But, as Figure 4 indicates, air,
water, motor vehicle, and pipeline transportation became increasingly important as an
economic substitute to the railroads after 1930. The trend away from rail traffic was
significant between 1937, the first year in which capacity data was compiled, to 1970 (Ref
L p. 707). This points to the importance economic substitutes play in controlling
monopoly behavior. Despite an expanded federal effort, rail transport declined in favor of
other relatively non-subsidized modes of shipping. Despite all federal efforts, railroad




Railroad Trucking Shiping Pipeline
Transportation Trends From 1937 to 1970 as a Percentage (1937 11970)
Figure 4 (Ref I p. 707)
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Even when substitutes do not exist, the threat of potential competition, and the desire
to maximize profits will guarantee some pricing discipline. Monopolists ultimately have to
be concerned about the economic viability of their customers.
It also should be pointed out that the very type of monopoly pricing from which the
government attempted to protect consumers was later initiated, not by the railroads, but
by governmental action. The government consolidation of existing companies, entry
restrictions, regulation of the trucking and barge industries, generous subsidies, and price
setting was probably more effective than any voluntary cartel because it was enforced by
the weight of the law, paid for in part by the tax payers, and included the regulation of
competitors outside the industry. It is also interesting to note that whenever the ICC was
directed to solve a long-haul/short-haul rate discrepancy, the solution was almost always
to increase the long-haul rates to equal the sum of the short-haul rates (Ref 7:p. 197).
Not exactly the solution most consumers would have imagined.
Railroad owners were not surprised by the friendly relationship which emerged between
the ICC and many railroads. President Cleveland's Attorney General, Richard Olney,
wrote the following letter to the president of the Burlington and Quincy Railroad.
The Commission, as its functions have now been limited by the courts, is, or can be
made, of great use to the railroads. It satisfies the popular clamor for a Government
supervision of railroads, at the same time that supervision is almost entirely nominal.
Further, the older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined it will be found to
take the busines and railroad view of things. It thus becomes a sort of barrier between
the railroad corporations and the people and a sort of protection against hasty and
crude legislation hostile to railroads interest .... The part of wisdom is not to destroy the
Commission, but to utilize it. (Ref 11 p. 526)
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The relationship between the ICC and the railroads proved beneficial to both parties.
The ICC was staffed largely by former railroad employees, since they already had the
experience needed to manage the job. This created a natural bias in favor of the industry.
Similarly, ICC employees who assisted the railroads were often rewarded with lucrative
jobs by the railroads once their ICC stay came to an end (Ref 7:p. 197). Thus, the ICC
had the dual incentive of justifying their own existence, and behaving in a way that would
be viewed as favorable by the industry. The automotive industry in the past and the
semiconductor industry today appear to be striving for a similar relationship with
government.
However, every effort that government made to prop up railroads seemed to be
countered by regulations designed to bring them down, or at least prevent them from ever
becoming self sustaining. These included pricing regulations, rail line abandonment
restrictions, mandating passenger services, short haul/long haul regulations, and car
sharing regulations. The ICC had grown in both size and scope and became a powerful
bureaucratic body. It seemed to have no intention of surrendering any of its new found
authority by allowing the railroad industry to succeed on its own.
ICC price setting has proven costly to both consumers and the railroads, especially
since trucking deregulation. Much heavy industrial cargo is being trucked when it could
be transported more cheaply via rail if the ICC eliminated value-of-commodity pricing.
This policy has created a double inefficiency. Lower valued cargo could be shipped more
cheaply by trucking, but it is sent via rail at a subsidized rate; many high valued items are
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being sent by truck when they could be sent more cheaply by rail. The total cost of this
inefficient allocation is estimated at between $300 million and $3 billion annually (1963
dollars) (Ref 8 :p. 82). Those who view railroads as being a close to perfect substitute for
trucking estimate the higher figure. Those who believe that trucking is a preferred
shipping median tend to estimate the lower value.
Another inefficiency which developed in the industry results from the long haul/short
haul pricing regulations. Since railroads were not allowed to charge more for a shorter
haul, they would often divert cargo along a longer route to command a higher rate. This
was profitable due to the high fixed shipping costs. Then shipping rates were set between
departure and destination locations. This discouraged long hauls by a single shipper;
however, if two companies were to split the haul, then they were to divide the costs based
on the percentage of the miles which they shipped. This once again led to long hauling in
order to capture a bigger percentage of total fees.
Inefficiencies were also introduced into the system through the rules governing freight
cars. Railroads are forced to allow other railroads to borrow their freight cars under the
common carrier obligation rules. If these transactions occurred at market prices, then the
railroads should be indifferent to such transactions. However, the ICC sets the rates
below market pricing. This creates a cross subsidy from the larger or wealthier railroads
to the smaller or poorer railroads. Once a smaller railroad had a borrowed car they had
little incentive to return it. This led the ICC to enact another policy forcing a railroad to
return a borrowed car immediately after its use, along the shortest rail path possible. This
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policy also proved to be inefficient. It resulted in cars being shipped empty back to their
point of departure. Jason Sumner and Allen Ferguson have estimated the costs of
regulation induced inefficient freight car utilization to be between S 1.5 and $1.7 billion
annually (1977 dollars). (Ref. 8:p. 88)
Inefficiencies were also created by regulations concerning rail line abandonment.
Robert Harris did a study of low density branch lines in 1977. He found that if railroads
had eliminated all the unprofitable routes, they would have reaped a one-time savings of
$1.5 billion in property sales, $2 billion in deferred maintenance, and could have reduced
annual operating costs by $140 to $300 million a year (Ref 8:p. 85). This would have
saved a total of about $500 to $600 million annually. Other studies by Ann Friedlaender
reach similar conclusions.
Figure 5 shows the adverse effects of the policies which followed the land grants. As
the debt of the railroads was diminished, you would expect to see a noticeable decrease in
the expense to revenues ratio. However, the ratio rem•iins stagnant. Up until 1930, the
total value of all assets of the railroad industry was less than the total debt.
The primary effect of governmental intervention into the rail industry was to distort
markets forces in every way imaginable. The general trend of the effort, although it has
taken on numerous forms, has been to maintain excess capacity and fund it out of general
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Figure 5 (Appendix C and D)
while at the same time it has created a dependent industry, and a nationalized industry in
the case of Conrail and Amtrak. Rates are no doubt higher than they otherwise would
have been in high traffic areas; in low traffic areas, the costs associated with maintaining
rail access in no way equal the benefits. Cross subsidization and other regulations have
injected numerous inefficiencies into the industry, which are uhimately absorbed by the
economy. The reputations of both the industry and the government were damaged by the
scandals which occurred in implementing federal policies And the political process was
used as a means of distributing the economic pie in order to award benefits to those
groups which exercised political clout. This is a trend which will be repeated in the
following chapters, and which may be the most damaging aspect of the entire policy of
federal intervention.
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III. FEDERAL IRRIGATION POLICY
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
An historical overview of federal irrigation policy begins with the first irrigation in the
western United States. It was conducted by the Mormons around Salt Lake Valley in
Utah. In 1847, they began diverting water to irrigation ditches and planted potatoes. By
1848 they had 5,000 acres of land under irrigation (Ref 12 :p. 13). In 1870, irrigation was
later used in the Union Colony on the Cache La Poudre River north of Denver (Ref. 12:p.
14). In 1871, other colonies in California located in Anaheim and Riverside began to use
irrigation (Ref 12:p. 14).
The first major federal irrigation effort in the western states occurred in 1877 with the
passage of the Desert Lands Act. It granted title to 640 acres of land (reduced to 320
acres by an 1890 amendment) at $0.25 per acre (plus a $1.00 filing fee per tract). In turn,
the settler had to divert water in order to "reclaim" the land within three years (Ref 12:p.
15). Subsequently the land could be patented at $3.00 per acre.
In 1888, Senator Stewart of Nevada introduced a bill appropriating $100,000 to the
U.S. Geological Survey to identify lands which should be reserved for reservoirs (Ref
12:p. 15). John Powell, who had spent a great deal of time studying the western states,
was put in ch,.rge of conducting the actual survey. One hundred and forty such sites were
examined by 1900, and 10 reservoir projects were estimated in detail (Ref 12:p. 15). In
order to prevent •e:,ators from purchasing up the blocks of land surrounding the
proposed reservoir projects, the bill also withdrew homesteading from the lands connected
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with these reservoirs so that the land could be properly designed, situated, and
constructed. Powell believed that this bill was essential to developing a federal irrigation
plan in the western states. The result was that the Land Office had closed nearly the entire
public domain to new entry by 1890. This amounted to about 800 million acres and met
much public uproar (Ref. 12:p. 16). This put Powell's survey directly in the path of
western settlement, the initial objective of the proposed water projects. Congress
repealed these restrictions in 1890, but retained the withdrawal of land for potential
reservoir sites.
The decades between 1880 to 1890 proved to be a boom period for private irrigation
(Ref 12:p. 16). Companies sold stocks and bonds to finance projects in many parts of the
West. Pamphlets were often sent out by project owners and railroad companies to
potential settlers in order to encourage western settlement. Irrigation congresses were
also held by irrigation enthusiasts starting in 1891. Many of these gatherings attracted a
large number of political leaders who transported many of the conference ideas back to
Washington.
The Carey Act of 1894 was the first major federal effort to place land under irrigation.
Each state was granted up to one million acres of federal land provided that the state
arranged for its irrigation. St.-tes were encouraged to contract with private parties to
construct the irrigation projects on the land they would received under the Act; however,
only Wyoming took advantage of the offer It acquired 11,321 acres of federal land and
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placed it under irrigation (Ref 12 :p. 19). One of the reasons the Act had little effect was
that much of the high quality land was already being settled
At the irrigation congress of 1896, George Maxwell advanced the idea of a direct
federal irrigation policy instead of the current land grant policy to the states (Ref 12:p.
19). Mr. Maxwell went on to form the National Irrigation Association which lobbied in
fhvor of federal irrigation legislation. The case for a federal policy was further enhanced
by Captain Hiram Chittenden of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. He issued a report in
1897 advocating the need for flood control reservoirs in Wyoming and Colorado (Ref
12:p. 19). The flooding of Imperial Valley in California in 1891, by a change in course of
the Colorado River also helped to 3upport this view (Ref 12:p. 20). By 1900, both the
Republican and Democratic platforms advocated a direct federal role in irrigation policy.
Th4, passage of the 1902 Newlands Bill, also called the Reclamation's Act, finally put
the Federal Government into the irrigation business (Ref 12 :p. 21). It established a
Reclamation Fund from the sale of public land. The money collected was directed
towards constructing and maintaining irrigation projects in the western states. The fund
was to be maintained as a revolving fund with settlers making repayment, without interest,
over a ten year period. It preserved the Federal Government's right to withdraw land from
homestead for irrigation works. It also stated ,hat ownership would remain with the
government even after the project payments were completed. Publicly irrigated lands
were to be settled under the homestead laws on tracts of land between 40 and 160 acres.
The idea was to promote family instead of corporate farming. Privately owned land
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irripted by federal piojects had to have the landowner living on or "in the neighborhood
of such land." No landowner could receive water on more than 160 acres. It also stated
that the water rites obtained by the Federal Government for water projects could not
interfere with state laws regarding water appropriation.
Proponents of federal irrigation made two basic arguments. The first was that irrigation
of the western states was needed to encourage western settlement. The second was that
the irrigation projects represented large-scale undertakings which were simply too risky
for smaller associations. (Ref 12 :p. 25)
The first argument is difficult to make since population growth in the western states
was unabated during this time period. As the table indicates, between 1860 and 1900
there was a population explosion in the western states, with a 558 percent increase in
population. Population increased 133 percent in all other regions during the same time
period. This growth occurred before the Federal Government committed one dime to the
Bureau of Reclamation for the development of water projects. Growth in the population
of the western states continued after 1900, with an increase of 242 percent between 1900
and 1940. During this same time period, the remaining regions grew by only 64 percent.
Between 1860 and 1900 the western population growth rate outpaced the rest of the
country by a ratio of 4.2 to 1. Between 1900 and 1940, after tl1e development of a federal
irrigation program specifically designed to promote western development, this ratio
dropped to 3.8 to I (see Table 2). This is not to suggest that early irrigation projects
hampered population growth in the west. It is only to point out that the western states
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were experiencing rapid growth even before the advent of federal irrigation projects. This
puts the stated need for these projects into question.
REGIONAL POPULATION TRENDS FROM 1860 TO 1940
YEAR WEST SOUTH NORTH EAST CENTRAL
1860 618 11085 10593 9092
1880 1767 16611 14509 17365
1900 4065 24446 21004 26279
1920 8875 33075 29632 33979
1940 13883 41665 35976 40143
TABLE 2 (Ref L:p. 22) (thousands)
The second point meets two challenges. If an undertaking is too risky for smaller
private firms, this might indicate that the risks are also too high for government
intervention with the tax payers money. Furthermore, private irrigation was taking place
all over the western states, as Tables 3 and 4 indicate.
As Table 3 indicates, the high water mark for the Bureau of Reclamation occurred in
1969, with just over 24 percent of the irrigation projects being funded by federal funds.
And Table 4 shows that the national average for all BOR irrigation projects is about 18
percent of the total. Of the 18 percent, some projects could have attracted private
investment and have been developed outside of the public trough. The imperative for
federal involvement is questionable when over 85 percent of all projects either had been or
could have been privately developed. Whether it was wise to construct the rrraining 15
percent will be addressed later.
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LAND IRRIGATED BY BUREAU OF RECLAMATION PROJECTS IN THE
SEVENTEEN WESTERN STATES
YEAR TOTAL ACRES ACRES IRRIGATED PERCENT
IRRIGATED (1 YR) BY BOR IRRIGATED BY BOR
1890 3631 0 00/c
1900 7527 0 00/%
1910 14025 473 3.4%/'
1920 18593 2205 11.9%/
1930 18948 2791 14.7%
1940 20395 3391 16.6%
1949 24261 5077 20.9%
1959 30741 6803 22. 1%
1969 34804 8576 24.6%
1978 43627 9576 21.9%
TABLE 3 (Ref 12:p. 17) and (Ref. 13 :p. 32) (thousands of acres)
LAND IRRIGATED BY BUREAU OF RECLAMATION PROJECTS (1977)
STATE TOTAL ACRES ACRES ACRES
IRRIGATED IRRIGATED BY IRRIGATED BY
BOR BOR
Arizona 1211 337 28%California 8604 2757 32%
Colorado 3458 866 25%
Idaho 3508 1493 4300 6
Kansas 2686 60 2%
Montana 2086 349 17%/
Nebraska 5698 471 8%
Nevada 899 133 15%
New Mexico 904 215 24%
North Dakota 141 29 20%
Oklahoma 602 44 7%
Oregon 1920 467 240/%
South Dakota 341 75 22%
Texas 7018 246 4%/-
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Utah 1185 330 28%
Washington 1681 901 54%
Wyoming 1685 355 21%
subtotal 43627 9128 21%
other states 7211 4 00/a
TOTAL 50838 9132 18%
TABLE 4 (Ref 12:p. 24) (thousands of acres)
Once the decision was made in favor of federal involvement, it did not take long before
the revolving fund policy for financing the Reclamation's Fund became stuck. As farmers
took advantage of the irrigation projects, some began to experience financial difficulties.
It was argued that additional federal assistance should be provided to financially troubled
farmers on federal projects (see Table 5). This was justified in terms of "protecting the
INTEREST SUBSIDY/RATE OF DISCOUNT
Payment Plan 3% 6% 10%
10 yrs/equal 14.7 26.4 38.6
installments'
20 yrs/equal 25.5 42.5 57.5
installments
20 yrs/graduated 28.9 47.8 64
installments
20 yrs/graduated 30.7 50.3 66.7
installments/grace
period/down payment
40 yrs/equal 42.3 62.5 75.5
installments
40 yrs/eqaul 57 79 91
installments/l0 yr
grace period
TABLE 5 (Ref 14:p. 53)
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federal financial investments and the commitments of purpose that had already been made
(Ref. 12:p. 25)." This opened up a flood gate of federal expenditures and involvement.
The notion of sunk costs were apparently of no consideration in the decisions made during
this time period.
In 1914, Congress enacted the Reclamation Extension Act, which extended the
repayment period from 10 to 20 years (Ref 12:p. 29). It also provided for a graduated
repayment schedule. Five percent of construction costs were repaid in each of the first
five years; seven percent was repaid each year thereafter. For settlers on existing
projects, repayment was extended 20 years from the date of the act. Two percent of
construction costs had to be repaid in each of the first four years, four percent in the next
two years, and six percent in the remaining 14 years. The act also included certain
penalties for late payment. A one percent penalty would be levied on all payments more
than three months late. Water would also be cut off to land for payments which were
more than one year delinquent.
Even with this reform, payments continued to be a problem. The Secretary of Interior
was authorized to continue water deliveries to settlers in 1921, 1922 and 1923, even if the
settlers were more than one year behind in repayment (Ref. 12:p. 29). It was also decided
that after showing "hardship", capital and operation and maintenance charges could be
deferred for a two year period. The capital charges deferred during this period would
carry a six percent interest charge. However, repayment could be amortized over the
remaining repayment period, reducing the overall burden of repayment A similar act was
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passed in 1924, which provided deferrals through 1927. In 1926, the secretary was given
the authority to defer payment for yet another five years, and to defer the repayment of
construction charges on whatever schedule he found necessary.
The "Fact Finders Act" of 1924 allowed for further repayment modifications. It let the
Secretary of the Interior assess different charges against different classes of land in the
same project to achieve an "equitable apportion" of repayment according to the lands
productive value (Ref 12:p. 31). It also established repayment as five percent of the
average gross income per acre, although this part of the act was repealed in 1926.
Further repayment deferrals occurred during the Great Depression (Ref 12:p. 31).
Repayment was deferred for one year in 1932 and reduced by 50 percent. The remaining
1932 repayments, along with the 1933 charges were again deferred in 1933 and 1934
Charges were once again reduced by 50 percent in 1936. Given the longevity of these
deferrals, there were some settlers who made no payments at all between 1921 and 1936.
Despite this generous payment policy, payments were still a problem. In 1939, the
Reclamation Project Act was passed (Ref 12:p. 32). This act allowed for deferrals of
repayment for up to 10 years after a project was completed. This act led to what
amounted to a universal policy of allowing all future projects a ten-year development
period during which no repayments had to be made.
There are other indirect subsidies used within the irrigation network. One such subsidy
resulted from the Colorado Basin Salinity Control Act of 1974. The act established a
salinity control plant and directed that 25 percent of the costs of the program should be
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repaid without interest over a 50 year period from moneys in the Colorado River Basin
funds (Ref 12:p. 43). Total expenditures at the salinity plant are estimated at between
$S.5 and $4 billion. The repayment terms of the act will result in less than six percent of
the total cost being repaid. Because of this, part of the cost will have to be viewed as a
partial subsidy since irrigation is a significant beneficiary of the salinity control program.
It should also be noted that about 37 percent of the salinity found in the Colorado River is
attributable to irrigation.
Another indirect subsidy came in the form of the Reclamation Safety of Dams Act,
passed in 1978. The act allows for the allocation of $100 million to finance projects to
enhance dam safety (Ref 12:p. 44). In 1984, this was increased to $650 million because
the Bureau of Reclamation's list of dam safety modifications had a cost estimate of $705
million.
B. CURRENT INEFFICIENCIES
In discussing the current inefficiencies associated with federal irrigation policies, it is
clear that the primary effect has been agricultural migration. It did contribute to the
objective of western migration. The question is, was the policy worth the costs? TLe
overall outcome is that agricultural land in the Midwest and South has been laid to rest or
never developed in favor of irrigated land in the West (Ref 12:p. 46). This has resulted in
a shift from regions with relatively high rainfall to very arid regions. This is obviously not
an efficient farming practice. One of the most outrageous example is that cotton grown in
irrigated deserts now competes with cotton grown in the South (Ref. 12:p. 46). As Table
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6 indicates, the southern California desert has an evapotranspiration (ET) rate of 82.8.
This is not an ideal climate for agriculture. Nor is cotton, with an ET rate of 31 (see Table
7), particularly well suited for this environment. These policies have led to an inefficient
use of land, water, capital, and labor.
ANNUAL POTENTIAL EVAPOTRANSPIRATION RATES IN CALIFORNIA
Region Annual Evapotranspiration Rate
North Coast 26.1
Central Coast and Interior Valleys 48.3
ISouthern Desert 82.8
TABLE 6 (Ref. 14:p. 91)
EVAPOTRANSPIRATION OF MAJOR CROPS IN THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY
Crop Growing Days Total ET(in.)
Small Grains 200 13
Beans 120 21
Grain Sorghum 150 24
Corn 150 27
Cotton 180 31
Sugar Beets 210 36
Rice 150 39
Table Grapes 270 40
jAlfalfa All Year 48
TABLE 7 (Ref. 14:p. 92)
Of the $22.2 billion dollars ($1,920 per acre) that had been spent on construction
projects up to 1986, only 10 percent has been repaid (see Figure 6). Clearly the programs
are not self sufficient, and any hint of a "revolving fund" has long since vanished. This is
further born out by fact. Of the 3,276,296 acre-feet of water delivered for the California
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Central Valley Project, only 16 percent of it is paid for in full by the users. This project





Irrigation Construction Costs Subsidy on All Projects (1986)
Figure 6 (Ref. 12:p. 38) (billions of dollars)
Another related problem deals with the users "willingness" to pay. Only 14 percent of
the publicly irrigated land has increased in value enough to justify the costs of its
respective irrigation project (Ref 12:p. 35-40). Assuming agricultural land values equal
the present value of their future expected net operating profits, the benefits of irrigation
outweigh the costs for only 14 percent of all federal expenditures on irrigation. This 14
percent doesn't take into account opportunity costs. For this reason, the actual percentage
of revenue actually invested wisely is probably substantially lower.
Another problem generated by irrigation is a growing population with an increasing
appetite for water (see Table H). About 90 percent of the water used in the western states
is used for agriculture. This low cost, subsidized water has certainly not encouraged
careful use of the resource. By heavily subsidizing water we have created what amounts
to "common" vice "public" water rights. Common ownership will always result in
shortages and overuse since the costs of an item will always be lower than its market
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value. The Europeans experimented with common ownership of timber until timber
reserves became virtually depleted in many areas.
There are two ways to eliminate the inefficient use of common property It can be
privatized or made public. Directing water away from agriculture and towards users
willing to pay market value should serve as an economic stimulant to the entire region. It
could immediately generate large water surpluses in many of the current drought areas. If
agricultural use of water along the Colorado river were to be reduced by just five percent,
it would double the available water for both municipalities and industries (Ref 14:p. 129).
WATER WITHDRAWAL AND CONSUMPTION






TABLE 8 (Ref. 13:p. 2) (billions of gallons)
It should also be noted that significant amounts of hydropower on reclamation projects
are dedicated to pumping irrigation water. Hydropower is provided at a very low cost
because of an interest free subsidy for irrigation pumping. This results in relatively
inexpensive hydropower being diverted from other productive enterprises to irrigation
pumping. The Bureau of Reclamation has even found it necessary to construct thermal
power plants for the pumping requirements of water projects. Table 9 displays the power
subsidy which is directed towards irrigation. During a time when water and energy are in
short supply, there is no shortage of alternate and more profitable uses for hydropower.
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POWER SUBSIDY FOR IRRIGATION
ROJECT COSTS COST PAID BY SUBSIDY
ALLOCATED TO IRRIGATORS (S)
IRRIGATORS (S) _
Central Valley 682,152,000 606,646,000 11.1%
California _
Chief Joseph Dam 11,083,200 6,050,000 45.4%
Washington _
Collbran Colorado 6,105,000 1,089,101 82.2%
Columbia Basin 745,111,398 135,916,400 81.8%
Washington
Fryingpa- -Arkansas 69,946,000 50,512,300 27.8%
Colorad
Rouge River Oregon 18,064,000 9,066,500 49.8%
San Angelo Texas 8,853,904 4,000,000 54.8%
The Dallas Oregon 5,994,000 2,550,000 57.5%
Ventura River 18,273,128 10,746,300 41.2%
California
Washita Basin 10,403,011 8,221,000 21.0%/.
Oklahoma
TABLE 9 (Ref. 13:p. 51)
C. OTHER AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES
Finally, it should be noted that subsidized water is often used to irrigate subsidized
crops. Over $17.2 billion in 1991 was spent by the Department of Agriculture (DOA) in
the form of farm income stabilization and agricultural research and services (this figure
does not include water subsidies). Total DOA expenditures exceeded $60 billion. In
1989, the Department of Agriculture had a total budget of $48.3 billion, which translated
into an average expenditures of about $16,870 per farm employee. Not all Department of
Agriculture expenditures represent a direct subsidy to the farmer in the form of farm
income stabilization or agricultural research and services. Two of the biggest remaining
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funding items are directed towards Department personnel and the Food Stamp Program.
However, these are indirect subsidies since these expenditures benefit the farmer, though
the exact benefit is difficult to estimate. Clearly, it is difficult to find any aspect of farming
that does not reach into the taxpayers' pockets.
The following federal programs are targeted specifically at agriculture: price support
loans; direct payments (e.g., deficiency payments and diversion payments), crop disaster
relief, emergency livestock forage assistance; federal purchases; producer storage
payments; processing storage and transportation; operating expenses; interest
expenditures; and export programs. This does not represent a complete listing, but it does
cover the major programs. (Ref 15.p. 654)
Between 1984 and 1990, cotton farmers alone received direct government payments of
$6,176 million. Total crop value during this same time period was $29,741 million, which
amounts to a subsidy of over 20 percent (Ref. 15:p. 651). Part of this subsidy involves
federally guaranteed loans for an income stabilization program carried out by the
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). This represents a substantial subsidy. Not only
are these loans made at a below market rates, but once a farmer enters into a loan
agreement they are able to sell their crop to the government at a pre-established price
(Ref 16). This price is almost always greater than the going market price, and r'.ver
below it since farmers have the option of pulling out of the loan and selling in the market.
This price stabilization policy is not only paid for by the tax payers, but also by the
consumers in the form of higher prices. Once a commodity is taken out of the market
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place for sale to the government, the supply is reduced, thereby increasing the market
price.
Direct payments to cotton farmers alone do not reflect the true amount of the subsidy
since the Competitiveness Provision of 1990 is not included in these estimates. The
Competitiveness Provisions provides additional subsidies to mills when the domestic price
of cotton falls 1.25 cents below the global price (Ref 17). This subsidy can be substantial.
It reached about 200 million in 1993. The consumers have also been forced to pay higher
prices for cotton due to tariffs associated with cotton imports. The current tariff rate on
imported cotton is four cents per kilogram. The greatest price paid by consumers in terms
of import restrictions comes in the form of import quotas on cotton. Only 30,000 bails of
short stem cotton and 95,000 bails of long stem cotton can be imported (Ref 17).
Current domestic production is about 500,000 bails, most of which is exported. So cotton
growers can be subsidized through a variety of programs which include water subsidies,
production subsidies in the form of "income stabilization", export subsidies in the form of
the "Competitiveness Provision" of 1990, transportation subsidies in the form of "value of
commodity" pricing regulations for railroads in addition to other federal transportation




In conclusion, the simple questions must be asked. Was the policy needed to generate
migration westward, was the policy needed to insure western economic development, and
did the benefits of the policy outweigh the costs?
The policy did accelerate migration westward during the earlier years However,
western migration had been a growth industry long before the Federal Government got
involved in irrigation. In fact, the policy probably exceeded its objectives as indicated by
the shift in agriculture from the moist midwest and south to the and southwest (e.g.,
cotton). In perhaps the greatest twist of irony, a policy whose initial justification was to
encourage expansion westward is now proving to be one of the greatest hindrance to
western economic growth, given the strain on existing water supplies. The costs of the
policy has certainly exceeded any imagined benefit. Aggregate utility has been reduced by
an inefficient use of resources through the transfer of both labor and capital into an
industry which is sheltered from market disciplines. And by opting to pay more for
agricultural products than the market would otherwise dictate due to price stabilization
programs we experience opportunity costs resulting in an inability to buy other
commodities.
Federal irrigation policy is just one more example of a federal program for which the
sun never set. This kind of policy longevity is perhaps the greatest danger of any
industrial policy. It also shows, as in the case of the railroads, how a select group can
co-opt the power of government to advance their own financial interest at the expense of
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others, and the economy as a whole. These concerns raise the following questions: if a
bad policy is enacted, or if a good policy has outlived its usefulness, is there anyway to get
rid of it within the political realm? And given this, do the benefits of a policy, even a good




Perhaps the most influential industrial policy to be implemented prior to 1918 was
tariffs to shelter American corporations from foreign competition. The following section
will be a macro overview of tariff rates and their effect on the economy as a whole.
Although tariff policy continued to play an important role in the economy after 1918, their
effect on the economy was limited due to the growth in other revenue sources. Figure 7
shows the declining trend of customs revenues as a percentage of total revenues. After
the Civil War, internal revenues began to equal customs revenues. Prior to this, customs
accounted for over 88 percent of all revenues. It is for this reason that the pre-Civil War
period allows for the most accurate testing of the effects of tariff policy.
°100
Y1799-1862 Y1863-1916 Y1917-1941 Y1942-1970
Tariffs as a Percentage of Total Revenues 1799-1970
Figure 7 (Ref. l:p. 1105-1106)
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TARIFFS ENACTED BETWEEN 1857 and 1913
ATE NAME AVE DUTIABLE AVE TARIFF
RATE
1857 22% 19%
1862 Morrill 36% 26%




1891 McKinley 47% 26%
1895 Wilson-Gorman 42% 200/
1897 Dingley 500/o 25%
1910 Payne-Aldrich 41% 21%
1915 (1918) Underwood-Simmon 33% (24%) 12% (6%)
TABLE 10 (Ref 3:p. 392)
Tariffs have been used as a means to generate revenues since Colonial times. However,
the tariff was first considered as a instrument of protection in 1816 (Ref. 18:p 139). At
the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars, Thomas Jefferson feared that cheap manufactures
from Europe would wipe out upstart industries in the United States. This would pose a
direct threat to our national independence. "To be independent for the comforts of life we
must fabricate them ourselves. We must now place the manufacturer by the side of the
agriculturist.... Experience has now taught me that manufacturers are now as necessary to
our independence as to our comfort (Ref 19:p. 178)."
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In 1828, the northern states pushed through tariff legislation designed to "protect" their
own industrial interest, much to the disgruntlement of the largely agrarian South. The
southern legislatures referred to the Act as the "Tariff of Abominations." The tariff was
allowed to lapse in 1832, after southern states threatened succession, but the political
battle between North and South over tariffs continued until after the Civil War. (Ref 18:p.
216)
The highest free and dutiable average tariff rate occurred in 1830, with an effective
tariff rate of 57 percent. Between 1834 and 1861, free and dutiable rates averaged about
20 percent (Ref. :p. 888). The Republican Party came to power in 1861 committed to a
policy of higher tariffs. The Civil War provided an ideal opportunity to increase rates to
generate revenues for the war effort. In 1865, free and dutiable average rates reached a
high of 38 percent, while rates exclusively on dutiable goods went as high as 47.56
percent.
As the war came to an end, tariff policy shifted from revenue generation to sheltering
and protecting certain American industrial and agricultural interests from foreign
competition. This represented the most significant and broad based attempt by the Federal
Government to influence industrial development; it has remained the tool of choice to this
day. Duties were placed on such items as tea, coffee, coal, iron, wool, paper, and a
number of other commodities. Despite the increase in tariffs which occurred during this
time period, imports continued to pour in. The additional costs were passed on to the
consumers in the form of higher prices. These high tariffs began to produce budget
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surpluses. This forced Congress to reduce the average tariff rate on dutiable goods from
48 percent to 39 percent, between 1870 and 1872.
The economic down turn of 1873 resulted in a decrease in consumer spending, and
hence tax revenues. This provided the excuse needed to push rates back up. By 1875,
dutiable rates were back up to 44 percent, a level just below the Civil War average.
In 1882, a Tariff Commission headed by John L. Hayes, secretary of the Wool
Manufacturers' Association, was established to advise Congress on future tariff policies.
The commission was stacked with protectionists. However, public opinion was beginning
to turn against high tariffs and the commission took action which reduced the tariff burden
by 20 percent, to an average dutiable rate of 40 percent. John L. Hayes stated that the
policy was "a concession to public sentiment, a bending of the top and branches to the
wind of public opinion to save the trunk of the protective system." The new act lowered
rates on pig iron, steel rails, copper and other commodities, and raised rates on certain
classes of woolens, specific cotton goods and certain steel manufactures. It is interesting
to note that the textile industry was treated very kindly by this commission, no doubt
attributable to the influence of Mr. Hayes.
After Grover Cleveland, who campaigned as a free trader, was elected to the
Presidency, trade policy remained protectionist due to a Republican majority in Congress.
A bill reducing tariffs was introduced by Rep. Roger Q. Mills of Texas early in 1888.
After extensive debate it passed the House, only to be killed in the Senate where
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protectionist sentiment was strongest. President Cleveland was defeated by Benjamin
Harrison in 1889. With his defeat, the first serious attempt to change tariff policies ended.
President Harrison was eager to increase tariff levels to further insulate domestic
producers from foreign competition. In 1890, he did exactly that by enacting the
McKinley Act. The average tariff rate on dutiable goods was increased to 48 percent The
textile industry was once again one of the prime beneficiaries of the new act. The tariff on
cotton manufacturers went from 35 to 50 percent, on cotton cords from 35 to 60 percent,
and on linen laces from 30 to 60 percent.
The McKinley Act also abolished the tariff on sugar. This was done to eliminate
another revenue surplus brought about by the higher tariffs. However, the farmers were
reimbursed with a two cent per pound subsidy to compensate for the elimination of the
two cent a pound tariff on imported sugar. This became the first in a long list of
agricultural subsidies.
The McKinley Act was also unique in that it gave the President authority to proclaim
duties on certain non-dutiable imports to retaliate against countries imposing unreasonable
or unjust duties on American exports. This part of the act was directed primarily against
our South American trading partners.
Grover Cleveland was re-elected to the Presidency in 1892. Free traders were hopeful
that he would be able to accomplish the tariff reductions in his second term that he had
failed to do in his first. President Cleveland passed the Wilson-Gorman Act, which
reduced the average dutiable tariff downward from 48 to 41 percent. Rates on wool were
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removed altogether. However, the overall rate reduction package was a disappointment.
In fact, sugar was placed back on the tariff list. President Cleveland was only able to put a
dent in existing tariffs. McKinley's re-election to the Presidency reversed what limited
progress had been made.
In 1897 the Republicans passed the Dingley Tariff It raised the average dutiable rate to
50 percent. Wool was once again placed on the tariff list and rates on silk, linens,
chinaware, and a number of other commodities were increased.
The Dingley Tariff was followed by the election of William H. Taft and the
Payne-Aldrich Taiff in 1909. The tariff was initially intended to reduce rates, but the
Senate once again insured that any change would be only marginal in nature. As a result
of this act, the average dutiable rate was reduced from 50 to 41 percent.
When the Democrats once again reclaimed the White House under Woodrow Wilson,
another attempt was made to reduce tariffs. The Underwood-Simmons Act was designed
to reduce tariff rates by about nine percent, with wool and many additional items being
placed on the free duty list. The act maintained duties only on "legitimate industries." By
1915, the average dutiable tariff rate was reduced from 41 to 33 percent, and by 1918 it
dropped to 24 percent. The average free and dutiable rate was reduced to 5.79 percent.
This represented the lowest average dutiable rate since 1857, and tie lowest average free
and dutiable rate to date.
This rate reductions from the Underwood-Simmons Act were significant. However, it
was also during this time period that the corporate and personal income tax became
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significant sources of federal revenue. Although Democrats reduced tariff rates on foreign
businesses, they increased internal taxes at home. The total per capita tax rate jumped
from under two percent in 1917 to almost five percent in 1918, reaching a high of eight
percent in 1921. Much of this revenue was raised to fund the war effort. So the drop in
tariff rates did not accurately reflect the aggregate tax burden at the time.
By the end of World War I, both political parties had developed similar positions on
tariffs, with disagreements centering only on the degree of protection that should be
provided. Republicans had softened their original hard line stance and Democrats had
abandoned their free trade position.
TARIFFS ENACTED AFTER 1913
DATE NAME AVE DUTIABLE AVE TARIFF RATE
1921 Emergency Tariff Act 29.46% 11.44%
1922 Fordney-McCumber 38.07% 14.68%
1930 (1932) Smoot-Hawley Act 44.71% (59.06%) 14.83% (19.59%/)
1939 Reciprocal Trade Act 37.33% 14.41%
1947 GATT (Geneva) 19.34% 7.55%
1949 GATT (Annecy) 13.46% 5.53%
1951 GATT (Torquay) 12.26% 5.47%
1956 GATT (Geneva) 11.30% 5.67%
1960 GATT (Dillion) 12.22% 7.40%
1964 GATT (Kennedy) 11.58% 7.20%
1973 GATT (Tokyo) N/A 5.00%
1990 GATT (Uruguay) N/A 3.30%
TABLE 11 (Ref 20:p. 4)
The Emergency Tariff Act of 1921 was the first in a series of new Republican tariffs.
This tariff was primarily created to protect American farmers. After World War I, the
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Europeans restored their agricultural production to pre-war levels, thereby reducing the
wholesale prices of American farm goods. It was hoped that the tariff would help to
stabilize domestic agricultural prices, but the act failed. This failure was due largely to the
high productivity and competitive nature of the domestic industry.
The Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922 helped shore up the Emergency Tariff Act of
1921. The new act made the higher rates on agricultural imports permanent, and raised
many of those rates above the 1921 levels. This was one of the most inclusive tariffs ever
passed, extending protection to almost every domestic industry. Duty free imports
declined from $3,116 million in 1920, to $1,564 million in 1921 (Ref 1 :p. 888). Dutiable
imports also declined from $1,986 million in 1920, to $993 million in 1921, due to the
increase in the average dutiable rate from 16.4 percent to 29.46 percent (Ref. 1 :p. 888).
The act also gave the President the authority to increase tariffs by executive order on any
commodity in need of additional protection. The tariffs objective was to "equalize
production costs" between American and foreign industries. The past veil of tariffs as an
instrument of retaliation against unfair trade practices was now being lifted in favor of
outright protection.
The last of the big tariffs passed by Republicans was the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930. It
was the agricultural bloc in the Senate that once again pushed rates upward on agricultural
goods. It increased some rates on manufactured imports, but it was dominated by
agricultural interest. Under Smoot-Hawley, duty free imports declined from $2,880
million in 1929, to $886 million in 1932 (Ref L:p. 888). This decline partly reflected the
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depression, but also included the transfer of items from the duty free list to the dutiable
import list. Dutiable imports also declined from $1,458 million in 1929, to $440 million
in 1932, due in part to the increase in the average dutiable rate from 40.1 percent to 59.06
percent (Ref. 1 :p. 888). Although per capita GNP declined by 31 percent during this time
period, both duty free and total imports were reduced by 70 percent (Ref. I :p. 224).
From this point on, the United Nations sponsored organization called GATT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) was the primary architect of international trade policy.
It continues to be so to this day. The initial Geneva round of talks in 1947 reduced the
average dutiable and duty free rate to 7.55 percent, from 14.83 percent in 1939. Rates
continued to decline to the 5 percent range through subsequent rounds of talks. However,
the average rate was increased back up to 7.4 percent in the Dillion round in 1960. The
average rate dipped back down to 5 percent in 1973, after the Tokyo round of talks. As
of 1990, with the Uruguay round of trade talks, the average tariff rate on free and dutiable
goods had been reduced to 3.3 percent.
The GATT process has been both unique and quite successful. It represents the first
effort at large scale tariff reductions on an international level. It has helped to reduce the
use of unilateral actions, which are usually of a protectionist impulse. At the same time, it
has introduced the concept of trade fairness in a meaningful sense. This has proven
beneficial not only to large economically developed countries, but also to smaller less
developed countries. These countries had often found themselves holding the shorter end
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of the trading "stick" when they were forced to participate outside of an organized
international body.
B. TREND ANALYSIS
In assessing the effects of tariff policy throughout this time period, it is useflul to
compile a trend analysis chart. The chart was compiled by analyzing tariff rates between
1799 and 1940. Data is analyzed to find increasing or decreasing rate trends over a period
of time and isolate the low and high rate in each trend. Only deviations greater than two
percentage points are noted in the chart. The primary advantage of a trend analysis is that
you are able to clearly isolate periods of high and low tariffs rates and show the long term
trends associated with each. This will serve to screen out the short term trends which will
be plagued with lagging indicators, thereby clouding the picture.
Between 1799 and 1940 there were only five periods of declining per capita GNP
growth in the trend chart. These declines bottomed out in the years 1829, 1869, 1893,
and 1933 (see Table 12). Table 12 indicates these rates of decline.
The declines in annual per capita GNP that occurred in 1829 and 1869 are clearly
attributable to the excessive average free and dutiable tariff rates, which peaked at 50
percent and 44 percent, respectively. The decline of 1829 was the most severe we have
experienced. It represented a 30 year decline in our standard of living, and it took over 40
years for per capita GNP adjusted for inflation to regain its 1799 level.
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TREND ANALYSIS CHART(> 2% points deviation)
















TABLE 12 (Ref ]:p. 224) and (Ref. 2 1 :p. 130)
The decline of 1893 was no doubt aided by the McKinley tariff of 1890, which raised
the 1892-94 average dutiable rate to about 50 percent. This was the highest average
dutiable rate since 1830. Although the average free and dutiable rate actually declined
during this time period, this , -,cline in rates did not accurately reflect the economic effect
of the tariff. This will be explained in greater detail later.
The second most significant decline occurred in 1933. The decline of 1933 drove per
capita GNP down to its 1903 level. The severity of the down turn was aided by a number
of factors. The first factor was the increase in the average free and dutiable rate from 5.79
percent in 1918 to 19.59 percent in 1932. The average dutiable rate also increased during
this same time period from 23.56 percent to 59.06 percent, once again the highest since
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1830. Both the Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley tariffs contributed to this
downfall. Although the average free and dutiable rates had been higher prior to 1911, and
at times much higher, the effects of these tariffs proved to be far more severe for two
basic reasons. First, our dependence on imports was substantially less prior to
Underwood-Simmons tariff of 1913. This act lowered the average rate to an all time low
of 5.79 percent in 1918, resulting in a flood of imports into the economy. In just a five
year period from 1915 to 1920, imports increased from $1,648 million to $5,102 million,
an increase of over 200 percent. After tariffs jumped back up in 1921, imports dropped
to $2,577 million, and fell still further to $1,325 million in 1932. Secondly, average free
and dutiable rates were under represented due to the substitution effect between imports
and domestic goods brought about by the excessively high dutiable rates. This is the same
phenomena that occurred in 1893.
C. GROWTH RATE ANALYSIS
As mention earlier, the significance of tariff rates in influencing macroeconomics events
was very much dependent upon the time in which they were studied. This was due to the
change in the percentage of total revenues represented by customs duties. Because of this,
the following growth rate analysis was divided up into three distinct time frames: 1799 to
1859; 1860 to 1905; and 1906 to 1941.
The period from 1799 to 1859 represents the purest time frame. During most of this
period the tariff was the exclusive source of revenue. This allowed for a more accurate
cause and effect relationship between tariff rates and other economic indicators. There
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does seem to be a strong inverse relationship between tariff rates and per capita income
growth during this time period, as represented by the following trend charts Table 13
represents the relationship between peak and trough tariff rates and per capita GNP.
Figure 8 displays the correlation between peak and trough tariff rates, and per capita GNP
growth rates.
TREND CHART FROM 1799 TO 1859











50.73% 23.41% 17.57% 15.43%
Average Annual Growth Rate in Trend From 1799 to 1859
Figure 8 (Appendix B)
During the period from 1860 to 1905, tariff revenues accounted for about 41 percent of
total revenues. There is also a visible inverse relationship between per capita income and
tariff rates during this time period, until you get to the 23-24 percent column (see Table 14
and Figure 9). At this point, growth actually drops off by about 1.6 percent annually. This
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reduction in growth is attributable to both the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 and the
growth in the number of non-dutiable goods. The act increased tariff rates on dutiable
goods from 44 to 50 percent within a four year period from 1890 to 1894. The effect was
even more exaggerated since the increases were targeted at only a few commodities,
resulting in a 30 percent increase in most imported textiles or textile products. This
decreased imported dutiable goods from $508 million in 1890 to $258 million in 1894
while the importation of duty free goods increased form $258 million to $372 million
during the same time period. This was the lowest level of imported dutiable goods since
the Civil War- This gave the illusion of a tariff reduction when viewing the average rates
of dutiable and duty free goods combined. However, the real effect was to force
consumers to buy the more expensive textiles made in the United States, amounting to a
hidden tariff or tax.
TREND CHART FROM 1869 TO 1899













44.76% 29.48% 23-24% 20-22%
Average Annual Growth Rate in Trend From 1860 to 1905
Figure 9 (Appendix B)
As an example of this distortion, consider two commodities, A and B, which each
represented 50 percent of all imports. Assume that commodity A was a duty free import
and commodity B had a tariff rate of 10 percent. Your average tariff rate would be five
percent. Now assume that commodity A remains duty free but commodity B has its tariff
increased to 100 percent to protect domestic producers from "unfair" competition The
new tariff on commodity B results in a drop in its import share from 50 to zero percent.
The net result would appear to be a reduction in the average tariff rate to zero percent,
since commodity A is the only import remaining However, the economic effect of this
new tariff would be added consumer costs in the form of higher prices for commodity B.
This distortion was not a significant factor in earlier measurements. The number of duty
free goods as a percentage of total imports was substantially smaller prior to 1873 and the
tariff rates on dutiable goods were lower, creating less of a tax differential between
imports.
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The final time period, covering 1906 to 1941, continued this trend, with the exception
of the 5.79 percent trough (see Table 15 and Figure 10). This tariff range was only
experienced briefly in 1918. However, during this period corporate and personal income
tax rates were increased substantially, resulting in an overall tax increase that more than
offset the potential positive effects of tariff reductions. Tariff revenues as a percentage of
total revenues dropped to about nine percent.
TREND CHART FROM 1918 TO 1940









19.8% 15.18% 12.51% 5.790.
Average Annual Growth Rate in Trend From 1906 to 1941
Figure 10 (Appendix B)
D. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Selected data between 1799 and 1909 was subjected to regression analysis to determine
if a relationship existed between a change in tariff rates and per capita income growth
The data used in the reg-- ion was represented by a ten year average of annual
58
compilations after 1889, and within ten year increments during the earlier time periods.
Between 1799 and 1889, GNP figures were only available in ten year increments. The
data was taken from Commerce Department data (see Appendix B). With R Squared
being 0.85 (see Table 17), there does appear to be a strong inverse relationship between a
change in tariff rates and per capita income growth
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF TARIFF RATES/PERCAP GNP 1799-1909
t Statistic P-value
Multiple R 0.92 Intercept -6.69 3E-05
R Square 0.85 1Year 7.051 2E-05
Adj R Square 0.81 Tariff Rate -2.43) 0.03
Standard Error 107
Observations 12
TABLE 17 (Appendix B)
Throughout most of the time period covered, there appears to be an inverse relationship
between tariff rates and per capita income growth During this period, tariff rate changes
can be isolated as a variable and tariffs represent a significant portion of total federal
revenues. This pattern was supported both by the trend analysis data and the regression
study. The argument may be advanced that tariff rates were simply linked to revenue
needs. This would create a situation in which an economic expansion would be followed
by an increase in revenues which would lead to a lowering of tariff rates in order to
prevent budget surpluses. In effect, economic conditions would determine tariff rates
rather than the reverse. This represents a "chicken and the egg" type argument It falls
short in three areas.
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From 1789 to 1985, federal debt as a percentage of GNP approached zero on only two
occasions (1840 and 1859) (Ref 22:p. 462). Given the historical desire to pay down the
federal debt, these are the only two times in which this rational would have led to lower
tariffs. Furthermore, there is no noticeable relationship between tariff rates and budget
surpluses and deficits. Between 1866 and 1893 when we experienced budget surpluses,
free and dutiable rates did go down, but dutiable rates by themselves went up. Between
1920 and 1930 when surpluses were also experienced, both dutiable and free rates
increased (Ref I p. 1114) (Ref L:p. 1106). Finally, given the legislative lags associated
with tariff policies, it seems unlikely that Congress would be able to consistently react to
movements in the business cycle in a timely manner, especially considering that these
trends were computed on an annual basis after 1889. If a relationship exists between tariff
rates and economic growth, it is far more likely that tariff rates effected growth rather than
growth determining rates.
The adverse effects of high tariffs on per capita GNP growth can not only be viewed
historically, but can also be explained by economic theory. The remainder of this chapter
will deal with some of the theoretical arguments surrounding free trade, followed by an
assessment of the value of tariffs as an effective instrument in promoting an industrial
policy and whether such a policy is even desirablh..
E THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
The theoretical basis for free trade was first advanced by Adam Smith as it related to his
utility theory of labor: "What is prudence in the conduct of every private family, can
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scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a
commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some pan of
the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage "
(Ref, 23:p. 424)
John Stuart Mills was also an early advocate of free trade, but presented two possible
exceptions. He believed that the price of a good must reflect its true production costs
(monopoly-power-in-trade argument for protection), and that it could be justifiable to use
tariffs as a diplomatic weapon to force open the markets of other countries (Ref 20:p.
25). Jagdish Bhagwati took a similar view to that of Mills. He believed that
Countervailing Duties (CVDs) and Anti-Dumping provisions could be justified in order to
bring a sense of "fairness" to trading arrangements (Ref 20:p 48).
Milton Friedman took issue with these exception.
The method that we have tried to adopt is reciprocal negotiation of tariff reductions
with other countries. This seems to me a wrong procedure. In the first place, it
ensures a slow pace. He moves fastest who moves alone. In the second place, it
fosters an erroneous view of the basic problem. It makes it appear as if tariffs help the
country imposing them but hurt other countries, as if when we reduce a tariff we give
up something good and should get something in return in the form of a reduction in the
tariffs imposed by other countries. In truth, the situation is quite different. Our tariffs
hurt us as well as other countries. We would be benefited by dispensing with our tariffs
even if other countries did not. (Ref 24:p. 73)
This conclusion seems to be supported by both the success of Pax Romana and Pax
Britannica. The expansion of free trade during the assent of the Roman Empire and the
repeal of virtually all tariffs by the British Parliament in 1815 after the defeat of Napoleon
both point to a direct relationship between unilateral free trade and economic growth (Ref
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18:p. 179-191). Britain continued on this course of action in 1843 with the repeal of the
Corn Laws (Ref 18:p. 138).
John Stuart Mills' arguments in support of conditional protection and Bhagwati's
support of CVDs and anti-dumping provisions may not be practical even if its merits are
sound. Economic decisions are not made in a vacuum. If market failure does occur, as in
the example of Monopoly-Power-in-Trade, there is no guarantee that government will be
able to correct the failure. Indeed, it may even make the situation worse by introducing
new problems into the existing mix The ability of a political process to implement
economic Pareto Improvements depends on the construct and defined self-interest of the
political realm itself As James Buchanan has pointed out within the school of Public
Choice, the distinction between the pursuit of the private vice the public good has far less
to do with a change in motives, and far more to do with a change in methods (Ref 25:p
34-37). Self interests are pursued both inside and outside the "belt way." Given this,
protection may well be granted not on the basis of economic rational, but on the basis of
who wields the most political power. This has been a very real concern of Murray
Wiedenbaum who believes that the day is coming when "the most profitable corporate
office will be the Washington office."
The second argument to be made against Mills was made best by Joseph Schurrpeter.
He believed that the perceived threat from monopolies is highly exaggerated for three
basic reasons: first, monopolists are always fearful of potential competition whether the\,
have reason to be or not; second, monopolists will always strive to maximize profits
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thereby setting a price which, depending on the elasticity of the good, is usually only
marginally higher than the equilibrium price would be in a competitive market, and finally,
in a world of rapidly changing technologies, monopolists must be able to compete with
potential or existing economic substitutes (Ref 26:p. 87-106). For example, the railroads
must still compete with the trucking, airline, and shipping industries even if a monopoly
situation were to exist. For these reasons, monopolies will be forced to maintain a
reasonable pricing strategy. If they are willing to maintain prices below their own
production costs for an indefinite period of time in order to fend off potential start-up
competition, then we should simply thank them for their generosity and divert our capital
to other more profitable areas.
As mentioned earlier, there are strong arguments to be made against high tariffs at a
macro level as it relates to both utility theory of labor arguments, and the more recent
debate over public choice considerations. These policies nurture economic inefficiencies
at both the macro and micro level by creating a form of income redistribution among
various industries, by sheltering certain industries from foreign competition and by
creating an environment in which legal and accounting expertise becomes more highly
valued than managerial or technical skills (in affect, more time is spent fighting over the
rules of the game and trying to adjust to the changes than is spent producing and
distributing goods and services). Finally, these policies vwll increase prices and reduce the
quality of commodities for consumers, t-reby driving down consumer utility.
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The income redistribution among industries occurs because not all industries are
protected equally. For example, the earlier tariffs were primarily directed towards the
industrial sector as opposed to the agricultural sector. This resulted in greater short term
profits for those industries under the tariff "umbrella." However, because the farmer was
forced to pay higher prices for manufactured goods, he was harmed by the tariff and
actually experienced an erosion in his competitive posture visa vie foreign competitors.
More recent examples involves steel manufacturers When tariffs were increased on
steel imports, American automobile manufacturers were forced to pay a higher price for
steel than Europe or Japan. This put American auto producers at a competitive
disadvantage at a time when the domestic industry was already in a state of decline.
Another example concerning steel was the implementation of "voluntary" steel quotas on
Korea and Brazil in 1984, in order to assist our domestic steel industry. The unforeseen
externality was the impairment of debt service by these two countries. This devalued the
portfolios of the banks in the United States which held their debt. (Ref 2 7:p. 78)
This redistribution is often politically motivated and usually results in capital being
diverted from profitable and successful industries into struggling or non-competitive
sectors. The historical preferential treatment of the steel, textile, and agricultural
industries is a good example. All of these industries at one time represented very powerful
voting blocs. Industries which were not sheltered would, like consumers, be forced to pay
a higher price for the products which were protected., thereby driving up their own
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manufacturing costs. They were also subject to the effects of retaliation by international
trading partners which will be discussed in more detail shortly.
The second factor to be considered is the effects of sheltering certain industries.
Although it can be argued that tariffs may benefit industries in the short term, it is very
difficult to draw those same conclusions in the long term. As mentioned earlier, there are
three industries which have benefited directly from tariff policies over the years: textiles,
steel and agriculture. All three of these industries have experienced tremendous down
sizing despite prolonged periods of tariff protection, and , in the case of both textiles and
agriculture, direct and indirect subsidies. It is also quit clear that all of the leading
industries today including high technology, telecommunications, and financial services,
have received virtually no protection (although this does seem to be the sector that
President Clinton is planning to target through his new "partnership" between the public
and private sector).
Murray Wiedenbaum accurately stated that "if industries are not allowed to fail, what
possible incentive could they, have to succeed." By protecting industries over a prolonged
period of time, you run the risks of encouraging corporate behavior which proves
detrimental to its long term competitive posture. Even though tariffs are often formed as a
short term fix to assist industries in getting back on their feet, history has shown that
tariffs are much easier to create than they are to dismantle. These policies also rarely
succeed in their stated goals. Instead, they' create an industrial dependent class whose
survivability is linked directly to the longevity of its political influence. It should also be
65
noted that most of the industries which are experiencing competitive problems from
overseas are low skill, high labor intensive industries. It should only be natural that as our
economy moves into the post industrial era that these industries will eventually fade away,
at least in their current form.
As mentioned earlier, tariffs also run the risk of inviting retaliation which can quickly
turn into a dangerous game of economic "chicken." The tariff wars which occurred during
the Great Depression are perhaps the best historical example. Total imports into the
United States declined from $4,339 million in 1929 to $1,325 million in 1932 Tariff rates
on dutiable goods increased during this same time period from an average rate of 40
percent to 59 percent, which was the highest level since 1830. A more recent example
would be the threat by the Clinton Administration to increase the tariff rates on imported
steel. The European Community (EC) has already stated that such a rate increase would
be countered by the EC with rate increases on American agricultural exports.
There is also the problem of politicizing the economic process to such an extent that
la•,yers and lobbyists become the prime capital investment. As Robert Baldwin points
out, as industry and law become more sophisticated, "protection is often less than
appearance would suggest, because there are many ways in which exporting countries can
get around it and continue to increase their export earnings" (Ref 20:p. 56). One such
case involved the exportation of coats without sleeves, because the tariff rate for vests was
below, that of coats. Once the "vests" entered the country, they were reassembled as
coats. There are also quotas on imports of pure cane sugar (defined as 100 percent
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sucrose) into the United States. Importers are able to avoid this quota by simply adding
sugar substitutes, such as dexstrose. And at one time, jogging shoes imported into this
country used leather to construct the upper portion of the shoe in order to escape the high
tariff rates on rubber footwear (Ref 20:p. 56). All of these examples lead to one startling
conclusion, lawyers may serve a useful function after all. However, there are costs
associated with this avoidance. In all of these examples, the product had to be altered in
some fashion. This could only result in increased production costs and or reduced quality.
Then there is also the obvious costs of running your sales office out of a law firm.
Another problem with tariffs is that they are a very hidden tax, paid in part by
corporations, but also by consumers. It is virtually impossible for the public at large to
estinate their individual cost of a given tariff If economic choices are going to be made
through the political process, then the participants in that process must be able to evaluate
both the costs and benefits of any given tax policy. If the individual benefits are made
visible but the costs are hidden, then an informed decision becomes impossible Rational
calculations are then substituted for passionate rhetoric by those w'ho have the most to
gain. The lobbying by the "gainers" will almost always be stronger than that of the
"losers." Gainers, although they may be far fewer in numbers, almost always gain more
per capita than the losers forfeit, assuming that the losers are even able to calculate their
loss. This will always create a bias in public policy for higher tariffs. It is for this reason
that we should move away from taxes whose costs are difficult to estimate and which
create both winners and losers within the body politic. A vocal minority, or for that
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matter a voting majority, should not be allowed to use the tax code to its own personal
advantage at the expense of someone else. Both the burden of taxation and the benefits
of spending should be spread out as equally as possible.
Manipulating tariffs to promote an industrial policy and or the growing trend towards
regional trade agreements could also undermine the GATT process (Ref 28:p. 73).
Outside of a GATT type system, powerful countries will be at a greater advantage in
negotiating with Less Developed Countries (LDCs). We export manufactured goods to
LDCs and then put up barriers to the importation of their agricultural goods This not only
prevents us from importing cheaper agricultural goods from abroad, but it denies the
LDCs the U.S. Dollars they need to pay for additional American exports to their
countries.
Finally, tariffs have the effect of increasing consumer prices since the duties will
ultimately be passed onto the consumers. This reduces consumer utility. The added cost
associated with protected commodities will also indirectly effect the demand for other
commodities or services. The consumer will be left with less disposable income. It then
becomes increasingly clear that tariffs represent at best a "zero sum game" in the short




Since the first question of whether or not an industrial policy has existed has already
been answered in the affirmative, there are several other questions which must be
addressed in determining whether an expanded role by DOD, and specifically ARPA, in
non-DOD related investment projects is desirable. Is the government better able than the
market place to spot sunrise industries? Does the government, and will DOD specifically,
make investment decisions based primarily on national security interest, political concerns,
or economic rational? Is government able to allocate resources towards industrial
development in a way that is more efficient and effective than the private sector? Does
federal involvement serve to strengthen or weaken the target industries, And can such a
policy be implemented in a way that is fair and equitable to all players within our "social
contract?"
No one has answered the first question more eloquently than Adam Smith.
What is the species of domestic industry which his capital can employ, and of which
the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every individual, it is evident, can, in
his local situation, judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do for him.
The statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought
to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary
attention, but assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single
person, but to no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so
dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy
himself fit to exercise it. (Ref. 23:p. 423)
Although the primary goal of the initial policies governing both irrigation and railroads
was to expand these industries quite literally into a new frontier, the policies soon changed
from one of assisting new industries to protecting old ones Few would be willing to
argue today that agriculture and railroads represent the future of industrial development
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Nor can the case be made that the railroad subsidies and irrigation projects were desirable
in terms of an overall cost benefit assessment.
To deal with the issue of whether the motivation behind the decision making process in
the public sector deals with economic, political, or national security concerns, Robert
Higgs points out that government growth and expansion into the private economy has
historically been justified by a "crisis." Throughout American history, a crisis was most
likely to take the form of a depression or war (Ref 9 :p. 17). Intervention wrapped in the
cloak of a crisis has the advantage of rallying public support in an emotional frenzy for
policies which would otherwise be unable to stand up to reasoned scrutiny.
In the late 1960's, Lyndon Johnson did exactly this by creating the perception of a
poverty crisis. We then declared war on poverty with all the armament of the public
treasury. If there was a notable trend associated with poverty, it was that poverty rates
had been on the decline from 22.4 percent in 1959 to 12.1 percent in 1969 (Ref 2 9 :p.
245). If this indeed were a crisis, then the results of the policies which followed were
surely Armageddon. But within the mind set of social tinkers, it is the effort and not the
effect which is of prime importance.
In the case of railroads, irrigation, and tariffs, a "crisis" was created concerning the need
for western expansion and the need to protect domestic industries. The concerns over
western settlement were unfounded. And the costs of the policies clearly outweighed the
benefits. In the case of tariffs, the need to protect key industries was often cloaked in the
rhetoric of our national economic interest. Given the inverse relationship between tariff
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rates and per capita GNP growth, it appears that effort and effect were once again on
opposite sides of the fence.
Lessons from the past, however, are not always learned. Today we have all sorts of
"crises" at our door step, ranging from health care to trade deficits and a "shrinking"
industrial base. The one commonalty between all of these crises is that the answer always
seems to includes more government involvement. The language has changed to meet the
current political demands. Central planning has now been labeled "industrial policy."
Subsidies and grants to private industries are now defined within the context of a
"partnerships" between business and government. Higher tariffs are now defined as fair
trade, with fairness being defined not by tariff rate comparisons, but by import/export
ratios. It is likely that any future industrial policy will take the form of either a
"partnership" or protectionism.
Even when ARPA is confined to its more traditional role of supporting DOD oriented
research, the opportunity for abuse is enhanced as ARPA itself becomes more politicized
Industries which may not be critical to national security may be able to work their way
into the funding pipeline. This is particularly true considering the current emphasis on
dual use technology. Industries may argue that their product is important to DOD even
though it is not DOD specific. Once this line of reasoning begins, ii is difficult to see
where it may end. Virtually any industry can claim some potential contribution to national
security. Clearly, political considerations are a major component within the realm of
public choice.
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The issue of whether or not the government is able to allocate resources more
effectively and efficiently than the private sector was answered by both railroad and
irrigation policies. One need only look at today's over supply of rail capacity and the
inefficient allocation of resources to both Conrail and Amtrak to see the inefficiencies
associated with federal involvement. In addition, there are regulatory inefficiencies and
other more broad based subsidies discussed in Chapter II.
Irrigation policy proved no more efficient. Eighty six percent of all federal dollars spent
on irrigation projects never generated a return sufficient to justif the involvement And
those projects which did prove profitable may well have been funded through private vice
public capital. Clearly, the industries studied in this thesis do not represent an efficient use
of resources by the government. Government was only effective at creating excess
capacity within both target industries.
In dealing with the issue of whether federal intervention serves to strengthen or weaken
target industries, it is clear that railroads, farming. and numerous other industries such as
textiles and steel, have long received a federal "umbrella" of subsidies or tariff protection.
None of these industries have become self sustaining despite prolonged federal
involvement And all of these industries have continued to decline It could be argued
that a lack of federal involvement would have expedited this decline, however, this -s
difficult to conclude with any degree of certainty. Anytime a domestic industry is
guaranteed a domestic market niche, they may lose the incentive to make the investment
and management decisions enabling them to compete internationally. Instead, they may
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decide to live comfortably within their own home market. The long term effect of this
mind set would be inefficiency and the destruction of jobs within what could have been a
profitable export industry. Clearly short term protection can translate into long term
opportunity costs for the target industry itself If DOD uses similar policies to support
information technology research and development for purely private industrial gain, then
decay and government dependency could be the future of the semiconductor industry and
other target industries.
History clearly demonstrates that industries which are sheltered tend to have less of an
incentive to make the difficult and painful decisions needed to compete and survive on
their own. They instead become something of an industrial dependent class, lingering
somewhere between the public and private sector, with a hand extended in either
direction. As in the cases illustrated in this thesis, federal involivement tends to become a
permanent, if not corrupting fixture within the industry Since the relationship usually
proves beneficial to both, those in authority have little incentive to terminate the
relationship, even if it is to the detriment of the consumers and tax payers at large. The
winners are easily identified, concentrated, organized, and therefore politically influential,
the losers are more dispersed and less effected individually,
In dealing with any industrial policy, be it an existing or a proposed policy, there is also
a basic question of fairness. Is it fair to change the rules in the middle of the game if it
creates both winners and losers? If a policy change is promoted to create an overall
Pareto Improvement, as most are, then shouldn't it be possible to create a situation in
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which there are no losers? If we allowed only Pareto Optimal change within the realm of
public choice, we would accomplish four basic objectives: we would insure that no one
who is currently "playing the game" uill be effected adversely by a rule change, public
policy would have to be more closely linked with sound economic policy in order to meet
the Pareto Optimal requirements; beneficial economic decisions would be easier to
implement since losers would no longer be a byproduct of the process; and finally, the
enhanced stability and continuity of the investment environment brought about by this
change would prove beneficial to all, and would greatly assist business in making
profitable long term investment decisions. (Ref. 25:p. 135)
To justify a change in public policy under these constraints, you would have to prove
that those who benefit from the policy experience a large enough gain that they would be
able to fully compensate the losers. If they are unable to achieve this objective, then it is
clear that the costs of the change outw•eigh the benefits. For that reason, it is not a Pareto
Improvement and should be rejected. The same standard of measurement should be used
in justifying the existence or elimination of established programs or policies.
For railroads, irrigation, and tariff policies, those who would be direct and visible losers
could be compensated for their loses in the short term by a cash voucher. Such a voucher
could be fazed out over a period of time. Existing producers would have time to adjust
and potential new entrants would know and be forced to conform to the new rules before
hand. Some inefficiencies would continue to exist in the short term. How.vever, the mere
fact that farmers would now be able to use their "water voucher" to buy something other
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than water, their "transportation voucher" to access modes of transportation other than
rail, and their "subsidy voucher" to ensure that production is still subject to the market
forces of supply and demand, would eliminate the inefficient externalities that currently
exist. In effect, welfare would be called welfare. We would be able to more effectively
and efficiently deal with it on that level. Cash subsidies as opposed to in kind subsidies
would be beneficial to the recipients by expanding their options and increasing their utility.
They would also be no more expensive to tax payers than the current system and would
benefit consumers as a whole by reallocating resources in a way that eliminates many of
the current market inefficiencies. And the greatest benefit would be the ability to phase
out an inefficient program resultingin substantial long term savings.
However, good theory and good governance are not always the same. What would be
difficult for a wise and virtuous Prince is no doubt quite impossible in a democratic
environment. Such a policy would be difficult to implement in terms of costs calculations
and just compensation. This would represent only the most visible problem. Within such
a setting, decisions must be made by someone or body of advisors who no doubt would
have their own agenda and interest to promote. So there would be no way to prevent the
process itself from being turned into a political contest, much as it is today.
Perhaps the answer is to be found not in a new Prince, but in a reformed Constitution
which deals with economic rights in much the same way that the current Constitution
deals with political and civil rights. The issue of constitutional reform has been addressed
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in somewhat different ways by both Milton Friedman and James Buchanan, and both
present arguments which are at least worthy of serious discussion.
To summarize, if past efforts at central planning as outlined in this thesis are any
indication of future results, future efforts would be both unfair to current "players" and
entirely counterproductive. In the case of the railroads, irrigation policies, and tariff
policies, the desired results were either not reached, outlived, and/or came at a price too
high to justif6y whatever benefits were obtained. This is not to suggest that there is no
such thing as market failure. It is only to suggest that there are also government failures.
We should not be so quick to assume that government can succeed were markets have
failed. Federal involvement may only exacerbate the existing problem, or create new ones.
Policy makers must weigh market and government failures against one another.
The current administration believed the electorate capable and competent in their
decision to send new leadership to Washington If the citizenry is considered competent
to make political decisions which effect everyone, why are we considered unable to make
rational decisions concerning our own utility when lefi within the confines of free
markets? The central issue concerning the advent of an expanded industrial policy is
clearly not aggregate utility. The issue is power. We should be cautious because power is




AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF EARLIER INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN THE
FORM OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE FREE MARKET:
The following appendix will present a chronological ordering of various industrial
policies enacted between 1789 and 1993. This is by no means an inclusive listing, but
should adequately depict the nature of government involvement to date.
Although tariffs have always been used as a source of revenue generation, they were
first used as an instrument of protection in 1816 Tariffs have been used extensively for
this purpose to date and is covered in much greater detail in Chapter IV.
About 3,359 thousand acres of public land grants were awarded for the development of
wagon roads between 1823 and 1869 (Ref I :p. 430).
About 4,599 thousand acres of public land grants were awarded for the development of
canals between ] 827 and ] 867 (Ref. I p 430)
About 1,405 thousand acres of public land grants were awarded for river improvements
between 1828 and 1847 (Ref 1:p. 430).
The Homestead Act of 1862 offered 160 acres of land to a settler for the cost of a small
filing fee, provided he lived on it for five years and built a house on the tract Between
1862 and 1900, about 80 million acres were homesteaded (Ref 2:p. 317).
The government operated Post Office expanded to include more territory, greater
volume, and more services. In 1863 the Post Office began city deliveries. In 1864 they
developed money orders. In 1885 they included special deliveries. In 1896 they expanded
to include rural deliveries. In 1911 they added postal savings and in 1913 they added
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parcel post. The Post Office was made a separate executive department in 1874 and the
Postal Service was started in 1913. (Ref 2 :p. 345)
A grant of $100,000 a year was given to the Brazil Steamship Company from 1864 to
1875. The company went out of business in 1893. (Ref 3:p. 396)
A grant of $500,000 a year was given to the Pacific Mail Company between 1865 and
1872, at the end of which time the amount was doubled. This grant was viewed as
necessary to support operations between the West Coast and the Orient. The Pacific Mail
Company was unable to compete with European lines and eventually went out of business.
(Ref. 3:p. 396)
The Timber Culture Act 1873 gave 160 acres of land to any person who planted trees
on one fourth of the total acreage. This requirement was changed to just 10 acres in 1878.
"Tree claims" amounted to about 9,745,000 acres of land, mostly in Nebraska, Kansas,
and the Dakotas. (Ref. 2-p. 318)
Munns vs. Illinois in 1877 upheld the right of a state to regulate businesses which
"affected with the public interest." States then began to regulate prices in a variety of
industries under the assertion that they represented public utilities. Most public utilities
were now unable to do business without a franchise or permit from a state agency. (Ref.
2:p. 507)
The Desert Land Act 1877 required a down payment of 25 cents an acre on 640 acres
with the agreement that a least part of the land would be brought under irrigation within
three years. Upon proof that the land was being irrigated, and an additional payment of
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one dollar an acre, title would be transferred to the settler. Final patents were issued on
2,674,695 acres (Ref 2:p. 318) The Desert Land Act began what would be an extensive
federal involvement in irrigation, especially in the western states. This involvement is
covered in great detail in Chapter III.
Timber and Stone Act 1878 stated that after a properly qualified person swore that the
land was unfit for cultivation and contained no valuable minerals, an individual could
purchase up to 160 acres of the land at a cost of 2.50 dollars an acre. The law first
applied only to Washington, Oregon, California, and Nevada. but in 1892 other "public
land states" were included in the provision. (Ref 2:p. 318)
The Postal Telegraph was the only rival to Western Union by 1886. But, the Postal
Telegraph provided service to less than 800 towns, compared with 14,000 towns by
Western Union. In 1910 the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was given
jurisdiction over the telegraph industry, and the companies in the industry were required to
file reports directly to the ICC (Ref 2:p. 345).
Beginning with the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and continuing up to the Staggers
Act of 1980, numerous pieces of legislation regulated and subsidized rail. trucking and
barge transportation. This legislation is discussed in great detail in Chapter II.
The Sherman Anti-trust Act of I 890 leclared illegal every contract, trust, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign
nations. Any person who monopolized or attempted to monopolize any part of trade or
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commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations would also be guilty of a
misdemeanor. (Ref. 4 :p. 438)
In the case of Smyth v. Ames in 1897, the Supreme Court ruled that the price set by
states for utilities must be high enough to allow the utility an opportunity to earn a
reasonable rate of return on a fair value of its property. The Supreme Court used the
Fourteenth Amendment and state court rulings to arrive at this decision The effect of this
ruling was to encourage utility rate setting by the courts vice state agencies. (Ref 2:p.
507)
In the case of Flint v. Stone Tracy Company in 1909, the Supreme Court upheld that a
corporate tax was an excise tax and therefore did not violate the constitutional provision
against direct taxation (Ref. 2:p. 496).
The Sixteenth Amendment was ratified in 1913, authorizing a federal income tax (Ref.
2:p. 496).
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 allowed national banks to lend money on farm
mortgages, and agricultural paper running six months could be rediscounted at the Federal
Reserve bank, whereas commercial paper, to be eligible for rediscount. must mature
within three months (Ref 4:p. 380).
The Clayton Act of 1914 was an extension of the Sherman Act. It forbid price
discrimination between purchasers of commodities whenever such discrimination lessened
competition or tended to create a monopoly. Corporations were forbidden from acquiring
stock in another concern where the effect was to lessen competition substantially.
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Interlocking directorates were no longer allowed in concerns engaged in interstate
commerce whose capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregated more then 1,000,000
dollars, if such comparies were competitors. It was made unlawful in the case of banks
for one person to serve as director or officer in another if the deposits, capital surplus, and
undivided profits of any of the institutions exceeded 5,000,000 dollars. And unions and
farmers' organizations were specifically declared not to be conspiracies in restraint of
trade. (Ref 4:p. 444)
The Federal Trade Commission Act 1914 established a five member body whose job
was to investigate persons or corporations subject to the antitrust laws, and present
reports of its activities. It was granted the authority to issue orders requiring the cessation
of illegal practices. (Ref 4:p. 444)
The LaFollette Seaman's Act of 1915 established a set of regulations governing basic
working conditions for sailors (Ref. 4.p. 219).
The Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 made it easier for farmers to obtain loans for
periods of six months or more, and enabled them to secure funds at a lower rate of interest
(Ref 4:p. 380).
The Adamson Act of 1916 provided for a basic eight hour work day for interstate
carriers in an attempt to head off a strike by the "operating brotherhoods" of railroad
workers (Ref 4:p. 466).
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The Army Appropriations Act of 1916 allowed for the takeover of the railroads by the
Federal Government on December 26, 1917. This takeover was to insure support for war
time mobilization.
Adams and Company, Wells Fargo and Company, American Company, and the
Southern Express Company were the sole surviving express companies by 1918. The
government ordered these four companies to merge into one company called the American
Railway Express Company. (Ref 2:p. 345)
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929 appropriated 500,000,000 dollars to be loaned by
the Federal Farm Board to co-operative associations in the hope that this would promote
orderly marketing (Ref. 4:p. 629) •
Perhaps in a formal bureaucratic sense, this nations first experiment with industrial
planning began with the National Resources Planning Board (N.RPB), from 1933 to 1943.
The board was created under the Hoover Administration and concerned itself with four
broad tasks: planning and programming of public works; stimulation of city, state, and
regional planning; coordination of federal planning activities; and research (Ref 5 :p 3).
Overtime the board drifted to the left. It advocated cradle-to-grave welfare programs in a
controversial paper entitled, "Security, Work, and Relief Policies." In response, the
newly elected Congress of 1942, displaying renewed conservative strength, cut off
appropriations to the NRPB (Ref 5:p. 12).
The First Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 established policies designed to reduce
the supply of certain commodities. If cotton growers reduced their acreage at least 30
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percent, they would be given options to purchase an amount of cotton equaling the
amount they agreed not to grow. The government also granted "rental" or benefit
payment to farmers of various crops for acreage temporarily taken out of cultivation.
Marketing agreements were initiated which were designed to eliminate waste and provide
for more scientific marketing (Ref. 4:p. 662). Farmers were also paid to plow Up existing
crops and kill livestock in an additional attempt to shore up supply (Ref 5.p 34).
The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 set general standards for the minimum
wages It was later declared unconstitutional in 1935. (Ref 2-:p. 410)
Congress enacted the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1933 to erect a series of dams in
the Tennessee Valley. These dams were to provide a cheap power source, a chain of lakes
in the area, adequate flood control, and help to reforest the region. (Ref 3:p. 456)
Funds were appropriated within the Neiv Deal package to construct dams along both
the Colorado and Columbia River in order to provide irrigation to those areas.
The Civilian Conservation Corps Act was enacted in 1933. It provided work for young
men, most of whom were just out of high school but unable to find a job. (Ref 3:p. 456)
The Second Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 maintained the same goals as the
initial act. Its primary aim was to maintain "parity prices" These prices were established
at 1909 through 1914 levels. The government set a "parity price" and quota each year for
a given commodity. If the price fell below this mark, the government would, in part,
recompense the farmers for the difference If production in any given year substantially
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exceeded the quota, then marketing quotas could be established by a two thirds majority
of the farmers producing that commodity. (Ref 4:p. 663)
The Fair Labor Standards Act 1938 further elaborated minimum wage standards (Ref
2:p. 410).
The National Rail Passenger Act of 1971 created Amtrak in order to relieve the
railroads of the burden of maintaining unprofitable passenger services. Railroads had to
pay an initial amount for the transfer, then were required to give Amtrak national rail
access below the actual costs for rail use.
The Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 was passed in order to reorganize
bankrupt railroads in the northeast into a federally owned and operated railroad known as
Conrail.
SEMATECH was founded in 1987 and represents a joint government/industry research
and development consortium. It receives DOD funding through the Advanced Research
Project Agency. Its mission is to develop generic research and development to assure
American dominance in the world semiconductor market. Consortium members include
IBM, AT&T, HP, rNTEL, Texas Instruments, NCR, Motorola, Rockwell, DEC, and
National Semiconductor. The Federal Government has been contributing about $100
million annually to this consortium. This represents about half of SEMATECH's annual
budget. (Ref 6)
The preceding policies clearly indicate that the Federal Government has been involved
in an industrial policy for the last century. This appendix was not intended to evaluate the
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worth of these policies but merely to identi6- their existence Chapters 11, I11, and IV
explore these policies in greater detail as they relate to the railroad industry, irrigation in
the western states, and tariff policies. These discussions describe their effect on the
targeted industries and the economy as a whole.
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APPENDIX B
TAR/RATE = AVERAGE DUTIABLE AND FREE TARIFF RATE (%)
PR/CAP58 = PER CAPITA INCOME ADJUSTED TO 1958 DOLLARS
CURRENT = PER CAPITA INCOME IN CURRENT DOLLARS
YEAR TAR/RATE PR/CAP58 CURRENT
1799 8.37 448 131
1809 12.34 423 130
1819 23.31 359 93
1829 50.73 340 78
1839 17.57 410 98
1849 23.41 487 107
1859 15.43 613 140
1869 44.76 4911 180
1879 30.33 641 147
1889 30.02 7951 202
1890 29.59 836 208
1891 25.65 856 210
1892 21.65 920 218
1893 23.91 859 _ _ 206
1894 20.56 819 185
1895 20.44 900g 200
1896 20.67 865 188
1897 21.89 930 202
1898 24.77 9331 210_
1899 29.48 1,0001 233
1900 27.62 1,011i 2461
1901 28.91 1,105 267
1902 27.95 1,0931 273
1903 27.85 1,1261 284
1904 26.29 1,092 279
1905 23.77 1,149 299
1906 24.22 1,258 336
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1907 23.28 1,255 349
1908 23.88 1,130 312
1909 22.99 1,290 369
1910 21.11 1,299 382
1911 20.29 1,313 382
1912 18.58 1,366 413
1913 17.69 1,351 407
1914 14.88 1,267 389
1915 12.49 1,238 398
1916 9.08 1,317 473
1917 7.01 1,310 585
1918 5.79 1,471 740
1919 6.2 1,401 804
1920 6.38 1,315 860
1921 11.44 1,177 641
1922 14.68 1,345 673
1923 15.18 1,482 760
1924 14.89 1,450 742
1925 13.21 1,549 804
1926 13.39 1,6191 826
1927 13.81 1,5941 797
1928 13.31 1,5841 805
1929 13.48 1,671 847
1930 14.83 1,490 734
1931 17.75 1,364 611
1932 19.59 1,154 465
1933 19.8 1,126 442
1934 18.41 1,220 514
1935 17.52 1,331 567
1936 16.84 1,506 643
1937 15.631 1,576 701
1938 15.46 1,484 651
1939 14.41 1,598 691
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1940 12.51 1,720 754
1941 13.59 1,977 934
1942 11.51 2,208 1,171
1943 11.57 2,465 1,401
1944 9.45 2,611 1,518
1945 9.29 2,538 1,515
1946 9.9 2,211 1,475
1947 7.55 2,150 1,605
1948 5.71 2,208 1,757
1949 5.53 2,172 1,719
1950 5.97 2,342 1,877
1951 5.47 2,485 2,129
1952 5.3 2,517 2,201
1953 5.42 2,587 2,285
1954 5.17 2,506 2,247
1955 5.59 2,650 2,408
1956 5.67 2,652 2,492
1957 5.76 2,642 2,576
1958 6.44 2,569 2,569
1959 7.02 2,688 2,731
1960 7.4 2,699 2,788
1961 7.21 2,706 2,831
1962 7.5 2,840 3,004
1963 7.29 2,912 3,120
1964 7.2 3,028 3,296
1965 7.72 3,180 3,525
1966 7.57 3,348 3,815
1967 7.54 3,398 3,995
1968 7.08 3,521 4,306
1969 7.11 3,580 4,590
1970 6.5 3,5551 4,808
1971 6 3,610 I 5,309
1972 6 3,7491 5,777
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1973 5 3,906 6,414
1974 4 3,849 6,886
1975 3.9 3,765 7,401
1976 3.9 3,911 8,175
1977 3.7 4,053 9,036
1978 4.1 4,222 10,105
1979 3.5 4,280 11,142
1980 3.1 4,223 11,995
1981 3.4 4,259 13,269
1982 3.6 4,108 13,614
1983 3.7 4,214 14,503
1984 3.7 4,457 15,913
1985 3.8 4,563 16,776
1986 3.6 4,643 17,511
1987 3.5 4,756 18,508
1988 3.4 4,920 19,783
1989 3.4 4,994 20,903
1990 3.3
(Ref 1:p. 224) (Ref I:p. 888) (Ref 15:p. 434) (Ref 15:p. 814) (Ref 2 1:p 130)
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APPENDIX C
TVL = TOTAL BOOK VALUE OF THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY
($1,000,000)
DEBT = TOTAL DEBT OF THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY ($1,000,000)
B/C = TOTAL BOOK VALUE / TOTAL DEBT
LG = FEDERAL LAND GRANTS TO THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY
IN ACRES (1,000)
FRA BUDGET = BUDGET OF FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION ($)














1978 38,935 _ 1,591,000,000
1977 38,342 14,881 2.58 1,333,000,000
1976 36,577 13,976 2.62 I 1,259,000,000
1975 40,196 13,473 2.98 486,822,000
1974 38,937 12,958 3 217,625,000
1973 37,897 13,092 2.89 116,531,000
1972 37,359 12,968 2.88 213,221,000
1971 38,022 13,588 2.8 67,784,000
1970 37,918 14,339 2.64 16,768,000
1969 37,383 14,701 2.54 18,570,000
1968 36,720 14,577 2.52 ! 16,044,000
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1967 37,250 14,690 2.54 21,974,000
1966 36,618 14,800 2.47 22,350,000
1965 35,489 14,857 2.39
1964 34,868 14,876 2.34
1963 34,519 15,011 2.3
1962 34,361 15,013 2.29
1961 35,541 15,179 2.34
1960 35,513 16,134 2.2
1959 35,157 16,365 2.15
1958 34,934 16,603 2.1
1957 34,614 16,775 2.06
1956 33,714 17,399 1.94
1955 33,034 17,422 1.9
1954 32,708 17,590 1.86
1953 32,416 17,658 1.84
1952 31,822 18,067 1.76
1951 31,077 18,220 1.71
1950 30,174 18,274 1.65
1949 29,519 18,343 1.61
1948 28,664 18,249 1.57
1947 27,686 18,050 1.531
1946 27,277 18,449 1.48
1945 26,967 18,681 1.44
1944 26,631 19,403 1.37
1943 26,145 19,914 1.31
1942 25,838 20,471 1.26
1941 25,668 20,708 1.24
1940 25,646 21,047 1.22
1939 25,538 23,609 1.08
1938 25,595 23,855 1.07
1937 25,636 24,123 1.06
1936 25,432 24,003 1.061
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1935 25,500 22,080 1.15
1934 25,681 24,570 1.05
1933 25,901 24,723 1.05
1932 26,086 24,837 1.05
1931 26,094 24,344 1.07
1930 26,051 22,783 1.14
1929 25,465 23,983 1.06
1928 24,875 23,747 1.05
1927 24,453 23,614 1.04
1926 23,800 23,677 1.01
1925 23,217 21,734 1.07
1924 22,182 23,636 0.94
1923 21,372 22,839 0.94
1922 20,580 22,290 0.92
1921 20,329 22,292 0.91
1920 19,849 20,098 0.99
1919 19,300 20,950 0.92
1918 18,984 20,785 0.91
1917 18,574 21,249 0.87
1916 17,842 21,049 0.85_
1915 17,441 19,720 0.88
1914 17,153 20,247 0.85
1913 16,588 19,796 0.84
1912 16,004 19,753 0.81
1911 15,612 19,209 0.81
1910 14,557 18,417 0.79
1909 13,609 17,488 0.78
1908 13,213 16,768 0.79
1907 13,030 16,082 0.81
1906 12,420 14,570 0.85
1905 11,951 13,805 0.87
1904 11,511 13,213 0.87
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1903 10,973 12,600 0.87
1902 10,658 12,134 0.88
1901 10,405 11,688 0.89
1900 10,263 11,491 0.89
1899 9,961 11,034 0.9
1898 9,760 10,819 0.9
1897 9,709 10,635 0.91
1896 9,500 10,567 0.9
1895 9,203 10,347 0.891
1894 9,073 10,191 0.89
1893 8,937 9,895 0.9
1892 8,690 9,686 0.9
1891 8,444 9,291 0.91
1890 8,133 8,984 0.91
1889 8,598 9,680. 0.89
1888 8,344 9,369 0.89
1887 7,799 8,673 0.9
1886 7,254 8,163 0.89
1885 7,037 7,842 0.9
1884 6,924 7,676 0.9
1883 6,684 7,477 0.89
1882 6,035 7,016 0.86
1881 5,577 6,278 0.89
1880 4,653 5,402 0.86
1879 4,416 4,872 0.91
1878 4,166 4,772 0.87
1877 4,180 4,806 0.87































TOTAL 1 _ 131,363 23,610,378,000
(Ref I:p. 734-735) (Ref I:p. 430) (Ref 15) (Ref 30)
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APPENDIX D
MREQ = MILES OF TRACK REQUESTED TO BE ELIMINATED
MGRANT = MILES OF TRACK ALLOWED TO BE ELIMINATED
MILES = TOTAL MILES OF TRACK
REXP/REV = RAILROAD EXPENDITURES/RAILROAD REVENUES











1981 3,339 3,539 278,000 0.93
1980 4,487 2,542 290,000 0.93
1979 4,055 2,936 300,000 0.95
1978. 3,379 2,417 310,000 0.97
1977 2,017 320,000 0.84
1976 1,634 1,788 314,000 0.82
1975 3,308 708 340,000 0.83
1974 2,247 529 354,000 0.79
1973 4,436 2,428 354,000 0.79
1972 3,978 3,458 356,000 0.8
1971 3,142 1,287 359,000 0.8
1970 1,762 1,782 360,330 0.8
1969 2,287 1,320 364,915 0.79
1968 2,036 1,890 366,238 0.79
1967 860 817 368,030 0.79
1966 1,920 1,054 370,104 0.76
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1965 2,224 1,538 370,636 0.77
1964 1,528 811 372,300 0.78
1963 1,937 1,688 374,522 0.78
1962 1,616 1,582 376,290 0.79
1961 1,140 1,167 379,415 0.79
1960 1,602 772 381,745 0.79
1959 1,203 1,180 383,912 0.78
1958 2,062 1,825 385,264 0.79
1957 1,190 589 386,978 0.78
1956 731 822 389,668 0.77
1955 975 514 390,965 0.76
1954 498 873 392,580 0.79
1953 976 1,102 393,736 0.76
1952 1,294 1,306 394,631 0.76
1951 815 564 395,831 0.77
1950 886 955 396,380 0.74
1949 1,178 1,185 397,232 0.8
1948 781 907 397,203 0.77
1947 1,074 1,241 397,355 0.78






























































(Ref l:p. 727-728)(Ref 15:p. 621)
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APPENDIX E
REHAB = LOANS FOR THE REHABILITATION OF RAIL LINE (S)
RR PROG = LOANS FOR RAILROAD PROGRAMS ($)
US RW ASSOC = LOANS FOR THE U.S. RAILWAY ASSOCIATION ($)
FEDERAL LOANS TO THE RAILROADS:
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